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Failing Women?
Structural Violence’s
Relevance in
Responses to Sexual
Violence: A Case
Study of Rwanda
ISABELLE LAMBRECHT
Sexual violence (SV) often causes survivors to
experience devastating health, social and
economic impacts. Framed within Galtung’s
structural violence theory, Crenshaw’s
intersectionality theory, and Giddens
structuration theory, this paper explores the
relevance of structural violence within two
community based organizations in Rwanda that
provide legal justice and economic resources as
a way to address SV in the country. Both were
established by the Rwandan government; gacaca
was established after the 1994 Rwandan
genocide and Isange One Stop Center was
established in 2009. Part one of this paper aimed
to integrate survivors’ personal experiences in
gacaca with several scholars’ research and the
Human Rights Watch reports in order to test for
the relevance of structural violence in gacaca.
Part two utilizes primary data and several
scholars to test the relevance of structural
violence within Isange. Ultimately, this paper
argues and aims to demonstrate that structural
violence is relevant in both organizations, and
therefore is correspondly relevant within the
global pathology of SV. Given this, it argues
that structural violence be named as a
preventable problem. Drawing from Isange and
gacaca, it provides insight into the ways in
which survivor-centered support, educational
campaigns, coordination between Government
ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and
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the allocation of further resources could be
utilized to better tackle the issue of SV.
Ultimately, grounded in the theory of
structuration, it advances a transformed
approach to SV at all levels of society in order
to revolutionize the SV pathology.
Methodology: Part one of this paper uses
qualitative content analysis to evaluate the
gacaca court system as the system relates to the
experiences of women who survived sexual
violence (SV) during the 1994 Rwandan
genocide. Included in this data are survivors’
testimonies. Primary researchers obtained
informed consent from survivors’ before using
their stories, and noted that stories were shared
voluntarily. Survivors reported to these
researchers that they shared their stories in order
to integrate their narrative into the broader
narrative of gacaca, and to prevent other women
from experiencing similar manifestations of
violence. In order to maintain an ethical
framework as a secondary researcher, I avoided
deceptive practices, and aimed to maintain the
stories’ integrity by reflecting them as they were
originally told, and keeping the welfare of the
research participants’ in mind. When a survivor
chose to include her name to the primary
researcher, I used this form of identification as
well. Part two utilizes primary quantitative data
that I collected in Kigali, Rwanda during the
summer of 2018 as well as qualitative content
analysis. Data were collected at Isange One
Stop Center (Isange), a government-established,
multi-sectoral clinic in Kigali, and analyzed the
clinic’s role in addressing SV. Data were
collected through anonymous, semi-structured
questionnaires, distributed to doctors,
psychologists, and police officers from the
center, as well as gender based violence (GBV)
officers at the Ministry of Gender and Family
Promotion (MIGEPROF). The head of each
sector within Isange received questionnaires to
distribute among her/his employees; thirteen of
the twenty-three Isange staff members were
interviewed. Questionnaires for Isange
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employees’ explored: perceptions of the clinic’s
work in regards to SV, the main drivers of
GBV, how MIGEPROF continues to work with
the clinic, and what constraints limit the
employees’ work with survivors. Questionnaires
for the government officers questioned: their
perceptions of Isange’s ability to accomplish its
goal in respect to SV and how the Ministry
coordinates with the Kigali clinic. The ethics of
the data were approved by the Rwanda National
Commission of Science and Technology. Data
from part two were analyzed using Statistical
Package for Social Sciences. The data from
Isange are not generalizable to all Isange clinics
present in Rwanda; however, do provide
nuanced insight regarding the pathology of SV
in Rwanda.
Theoretical Framework: This paper was
guided by Johan Galtung’s structural violence
theory, Kimberle Crenshaw’s feminist
intersectionality theory, and Anthony Gidden’s
theory of structuration. Broadly, Galtung
defines structural violence as violence built into
structure without a primary actor, which enables
the reproduction of unequal distribution of
power, privilege and resources through policies.
The deficiencies and barriers presented in
structural violence reinforce inequitable social
patterns, and most greatly impact those of
lowest race, class, and gender ranks. Critically,
the oppressed tend to be limited in their abilities
to gain coordinated power against the
oppressors.1 Kimberle Crenshaw’s feminist
theory adds to this framework, describing the
interconnected patterns of race and class present
in structural violence against women. She
defines the ways that policy undermines the
ability of women with these intersecting
identities to launch out of abusive
circumstances.2 These two frameworks are
relevant in the context of Rwanda, where issues
of poverty impact women. They support the
analysis of the many power dynamics present in
Rwandan women’s lives that inhibit their access
to resources and justice following SV. Finally,
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Gidden’s structuration theory complements
both, describing the dynamic relationship
between structures and human agency,
supporting the potential of flexibility, creativity,
and long-term changes within structures through
group action.3 His theory is relevant when
considering the global pathology of SV, and the
interrelations of community organization,
political will, and structural shifts.
Introduction: Estimates approximate that as
many as a half million women experienced SV
during the Rwandan genocide.4 Testimonies by
survivors recall gang-rape, rape with sticks and
gun barrels, the deliberate transmission of
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), sexual
mutilation, and/or sexual enslavement by militia
men.5 Adding to the humiliation of the trauma,
women were often raped in front of their
children, after witnessing their loved ones killed
and/or their homes destroyed. While some
testimonies state that perpetrators killed the
woman following the rape, other perpetrators
left the women to “die of sadness”6 and/or
sexually mutilated them.7 Each exemplifies SV
as a weapon used to terrorize women in an
effort to promote the Hutu cause during the 100
days of the Rwandan genocide.
The health effects of SV were
substantial. Psychologically, survivors’ quality
of life was damaged due to high rates of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
depression.8 Rwandan doctors also reported that
sexually transmitted infections (STI) were
particularly common among survivors.
Literature estimates that 70% of SV survivors
were HIV+ following the genocide.9 Although
it is unknown which cases of HIV were
transmitted through genocide related rape,
women’s testimonies confirm that HIV+ men
did deliberately “infect” them with the virus.
Medical treatment was not widely available, so
those with the virus faced a high risk of death.
Moreover, HIV was highly stigmatized, leading
to social isolation of carriers. Therefore,
perpetrators burdened women physically and
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emotionally with a stigmatized terminal illness
that survivors would be forced to endure
through death.10 Doctors also reported high
rates of complications due to self-induced
abortions as well as pain, infections, and birth
complications due to sexual mutilation. Since
sexual abuse and abortion were highly
stigmatized, professionals state that many
women did not seek consultation, causing
further infection and stress.11
Identity also played a significant role in
the trauma experienced. Perpetrators of SV, not
only harmed the individual woman's physical
body, but also damaged fundamental aspects of
her Tutsi identity like her ethnicity, religion,
social class and/or political affiliation.12 Due to
the social stigma of rape, following the trauma,
the woman not only carried her own shame, but
also the shame of her community, adding to the
complexity of the stress survivors experienced
following the genocide.13 Additionally, as was
alluded to previously, SV leads to detrimental
social stigma throughout Rwanda. SV survivors
reported that they felt an intense sense of
isolation and ostracization, and feared that
speaking out would cause them to be rejected by
their family, friends and neighbors.14 This
destruction of social capital caused women to be
outsiders in their community, impacting their
sense of belonging, and also limiting their
ability to marry and build their own family.15
Connected to the physical and social trauma
experienced, women faced dire economic
disempowerment. Many women experienced the
death of male relatives during the genocide, or
lost them due to imprisonment. Due to reliance
on these male relatives, women did not have the
resources necessary to maintain their
livelihoods, so they struggled to feed themselves
and their families, and/or to reclaim their
property and fix their homes.16 Property was a
particularly prominent issue as men had
dominant land rights over women leaving
women without resources and legal rights, and
yet with a dire need to reclaim the property
through a legal process. As the Human Rights
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Watch (HRW) reported, in 1996, the Justice,
Law Enforcement, Health and Rehabilitation
Ministries still had not created a coordinated
strategy to account for womens’ dire
circumstances.17
To address the devastations of the Rwandan
genocide for broader society, the Rwandan
government established three levels of courts
throughout the country. These judicial bodies
included the International Criminal Tribunal
Court (ICTR), national courts, and the gacaca
court system. The most in line with Western
standards were the ICTR and the national
courts, while the gacaca court was a hybrid
system that took an alternative approach to
navigating the legal systems. In sorting which
crimes went to each court, four categories of
genocide crimes were established, each
depending on individual responsibility and
holding a different penality. The international
and national courts heard the most extreme
category one cases, while gacaca heard category
two through four cases. SV specifically had
been a category one crime, heard by the ICTR,
but due to slow processing rates was reduced in
seriousness and therefore heard in gacaca
courts.18
Gacaca’s goal was pitched as a social
process that offered an alternative approach to
revealing the truth and ending impunity. It
favored community engagement, aiming to
provide healing through the truth and
distributive justice to survivors.19 Moreover, it
aimed to reintegrate perpetrators into their
homes, rather than keeping them locked in
prison. The community centered hearings, open
for all community members to participate in as
witnesses and judges, theoretically fostered an
environment where evidence was easily brought
forth and discussed, allowing for an open
conversation, and thus truth and reconciliation.
During 2004 and 2005, the government
established billboards marketing gacaca with
propaganda stating “the truth is healing.”20 The
campaign aimed to complement the courts’ goal
of transforming the harmful ideology that
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caused the ethnic violence and to rebuild the
nation—socially and economically.21
Gacaca left many SV survivors without
medical or psychological help. Beyond those
who were not able to access services through
the system, the majority of survivors did not
speak openly about their experience due to the
fear of having to testify or due to the social
stigma associated with rape.22 This left women
in a vulnerable position. For instance, survivors
of SV have far higher rates of PTSD.23 Since
gacaca’s shortcomings, Rwanda seems to have
made progress advancing women’s rights and
roles. Since the genocide, there has been a
breakthrough in women’s empowerment efforts,
coming from the top-down. Benevolent dictator,
President Kagame has been popular for
presenting gender equality as one of his
priorities, and for the apparent progress that has
followed.24 Today, 67.5% of the parliament is
composed of women—the highest percentage in
the world. The World Economic Forum ranks
Rwanda number six for its effort to reduce the
gender gap, highlighting the ways that Rwanda
serves as an international leader in efforts
towards gender equality.25 The United Nations
(UN) highlights recent domestic laws passed in
an effort to combat GBV in Rwanda, including
a minimum requirement of 30% participation of
women in decision-making at all levels, as well
as the Gender Observatory, charged with
monitoring the implementation of gender
indicators in all programs, at all levels.26
Legally, Rwandan women now have the right to
own land and property due to the Inheritance
Law of 1998.27 The government has also made
efforts to address GBV through the
establishment of the Law on the Prevention and
Punishment of Violence Against Women
(Rwanda: Law No. 59/2008).28 The law
includes all forms of intimate partner violence,
and the minimum penalty is six months in
prison, while SV oleading to terminal illness or
death of one’s spouse can lead to life
imprisonment.
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Still, Rwanda continues to grapple with
inequalities against women in the health,
education, and economic realms. In the modern
day, GBV, the spread of HIV, and the
interrelations of the two have continued to
burden women with long term trauma, stigma,
social isolation, and economic hardship.29 In
2009, Isange was established under One UN.
This clinic offers psycho-social, medical, and
legal services to survivors of domestic abuse
and SV, as well as women living with HIV.
Since Isange’s establishment, the UN found that
the clinic has a significantly higher success rate
than similar services that had previously existed
in Rwanda. Still, the report found deficiencies in
regards to the clinic’s ability to conduct followups with victims, the consistency of legal help,
the breadth of awareness raising, and the
strength of links between the clinic and relevant
ministries. Ultimately, the UN listed the need to:
provide victims with more consistent legal aid
and advice, improve follow-up services, and
establish better connections with legal
institutions as well as members of the
community.30
Part I of this paper tests for the relevance
of structural violence within the gacaca system
in regards to the experiences of survivors of SV.
Part II of this paper includes my exploratory
study of Isange, which analyzed the short
fallings named by the UN, testing for the
relevance of structural violence. Gacaca and
Isange are both government-sponsored,
community-based organizations offering access
to legal justice and resources for survivors of
SV. An examination of the shortcomings of
Gacaca and Isange and the relevance of
structural violence to these short fallings allow
for a broader understanding of the ways in
which structural violence manifests within
community based organizations. The research
allows for a greater understanding of the role of
structural violence in the global pathology of
SV, ultimately allowing for the public to combat
it.
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PART I: Relevance of Structural Violence
within Gacaca in regards to SV Survivors
A. Dangers within the Courts: This section
explores the relevance of structural violence
within the gacaca system. Scholars, NGO
officers, and sexual violence survivors alike
advocate that the gacaca system wasis not safe
fo SV survivors. For instance, while the
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions
(SNGJ) emphasized the need to mobilize sexual
violence survivors to bring cases to court,
scholars and NGO officials argued that gacaca
as an institution and within the context of the
culture in Rwanda lead to further harm for
survivors psychologically and physically.30 A
2002 survey by the NURC reports “unanimous
agreement…that the risks of testifying female
survivors are much greater than those of their
male counterparts.”31
One key aspect of harm within the
gacaca model for sexual violence surviovrs was
high risk of further traumatization. One survivor
said, "A negative effect of gacaca is that for
many people it increases the trauma. Among
people who had just found a way to cope with it,
I notice a relapse because they must talk about
the genocide and they remember the events
again.”32 Similar to this, Clementine stated “I
never went to the gacaca court when [my
rapists] were being tried because I could not
bear to see them again. I also could not tell the
gacaca judges [the truth] because the rapists’
supporters would have mocked and intimidated
me. I don’t want to give them the satisfaction of
seeing me traumatized again.”33 A report from
the Gacaca Jurisdiction in 2005 validates this
argument that gacaca led to people experiencing
further trauma; however, the statistics are not
able to be separated by gender or gacaca
crime.34 The 2005 progress report also includes
statistics of the number of victims who showed
trauma symptoms during trials. According to the
report, there were 273 in sector courts, 43 in
appeals courts, and 637 during the data
collection phase.35 Trauma counsellors have
found the majority of survivors reported
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increased emotional and psychological suffering
after testifying.36 Without engaging in gacaca,
scholar Brouneus found that gacaca women
survivors already had higher rates of PTSD and
depression than men, showing how vulnerable
survivors who testified were.37 The National
Unity and Reconciliation Commission reported
that fifty-eight percent of women report that
they have already "suffered too much to be
interested in gacaca.”38
Adding to the psychological harm
experienced, several accounts advocate that
survivors also experienced physical dangers
following their testimony. Scholars explain that
violence serves both to silence witnesses and
also to punish “those who make the mistake of
testifying.”39 NGO leader stated: Victims fear
that testifying and consequently exposing their
experiences of sexual abuse will lead to
community ostracism, ineligibility to marry and
other secondary harms not similarly associated
with the disclosure of non-sexual wartime
assaults.”40 Survivors’ testimonies echo this.
One survivor states, “After [testifying at] gacaca
everything has changed because they even dare
[to] destroy my house, break my windows.”41
Another survivor, who was mass raped during
the genocide at the age of 15 and has one child
from rape, testified, “I am not safe because the
people who hurt me have been released from
prison. After [my gacaca testimony] they came.
They broke my windows. I was afraid. I thought
I would be killed. I do not go to gacaca any
longer.”42 Another survivor explained that after
testifying, community members asked “if she
knows when the Interahamwe [the militia men
who had raped her] are coming.”43 Other
survivors share that following their testimonies,
perpetrators brought cows to graze on their land
plots as a way to jeopardize their access to food
and to further humiliate them.44 Yet another
survivor states, “When I wanted to testify, they
did not want me to give correct testimony, so
they tried to make me be quiet...They attacked
my home three time successively. Before
testifying, there was neither insecurity nor
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attacks.”45 The 2011 Human Rights Watch
report highlights the theme of these testimonies,
featuring a significant number of Rwandan SV
survivors who voiced concerns about retaliatory
actions and renewed violence.46
B. Institutional Failings: The physical danger
experienced and the prominence of stigma and
social rejection around sexual violence indicate
the need for protections for survivors who chose
to utilize the gacaca courts. In fact, records by
SV leaders tend to document women feeling
neglected by the government.47 The
government did offer some security for
survivors who chose to utilize the courts;
however, there lacked proper implementation.
For instance, one amendment to the gacaca
court laws established that survivors could
testify in front of a camera rather than an
audience.48 Gacaca also experimented with
“women only” courts and courts in which one
judge heard a survivor’s testimony and then
reported it back to the full gacaca court.49
Again, because of inconsistent implementation,
many NGOs reported survivors were unaware
of the option.50 Even with the ability to testify
privately, scholars have argued that gacaca
sessions were held in public spaces, so
community members were able to see who was
entering the building and automatically classify
them as a rape victim.51 This in turn resulted in
similar stigma and violence as described.
Scholars have argued that even further
protections should have been put in place. For
instance, NGO officers assert that lack of legal
representation for the victim was likely to cause
further trauma as the survivors often had little
knowledge of the system, undermining her
capacity to navigate the legal bureaucracy and
defend herself during questioning.52 The lack
of trained judges also jeopardized the safety of
testimonies, as they did not receive training
around handling SV in a survivor-centric
manner.53 Scholars argue that victim
participation in gacaca was constrained by
social attitudes towards sex in Rwanda. One
often used line, to emphasize the degree to
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which Rwandans do not talk about sex, is: "the
words to describe some sexual acts do not even
exist in Kinyarwanda.”54
C. Distributive Justice: Along with
reconciliation, the gacaca courts were also
theoretically supposed to provide distributive
justice to survivors. Distributive justice is
focused on providing support to survivors.
Thus, reparations are hailed as a vital
component of transitional justice programs
because they are the “most victim-centred
justice mechanism available.”55 The HRW has
taken special interest in this topic as a way in
which both domestic and international
communities might better meet the needs of the
rape survivors in post-conflict settings.56 In
1996, organic law mentioned a compensation
fund for survivors, which was known as FIND;
however, this fund was never officially
launched. Draft laws regarding FIND stated that
gacaca courts were responsible for compiling
lists of damages to survivors and reporting them
to FIND. Following, and in accordance with
gacaca recommendations, the organization
would award reparations. These lists do exist
and could have been used to achieve distributive
justice; however, due to an insufficient political
will and scarce financing, survivors will likely
never receive the resources they are entitled
to.57
Without said resources, survivors’
immediate needs for food, shelter, and health
care were often left unmet. Personal narratives
demonstrate the need for distributive justice.
Emely, a survivor of sexual enslavement and
tested HIV-positive stated to HRW, "HIVpositive women who have money simply pay
for ARV drugs, but other women can't.”58
Another need of survivors living with HIV was
transportation to health clinics. This need was
particularly prominent among the 90% of the
population living in rural areas and also for
those who were already too weak to walk.59
Finally, the lack of distributive justice affected
the accessibility of the court system. MG, who
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was facing severe financial distress due to being
too weak to farm because of HIV explained, “I
decided to deal with the problems I have . . . I
thought about going to [a legal assistance
center], but I wanted to be at peace. And that
meant dealing with my HIV...and having my
baby.” Her story demonstrates the compromise
women had to make between meeting their
health needs and seeking legal redress while
surviving on limited resources.60
HRW found that one third of the
Rwandan rape survivors interviewed were
frustrated by the lack of monetary compensation
after her perpetrator had been convicted.61 This
statistic contributes to broader notions of justice
for survivors of SV, suggesting that
compensation would provide women with a
stronger sense of justice. Moreover, without
survivors’ post-genocide needs for health care,
food, and shelter being met, survivors were
unable to seek legal redress, build their families,
careers and communities, and to heal from the
trauma. Given that many lost their family and
friends during the genocide, the lack of financial
resources meant they were without all possible
supportive means to assist them in rebuilding
their lives. The proper implementation of
distributive justice would help mitigate the
health and economic effects of violence in postconflict settings, and provide a desired avenue
to justice.
D. Relevance of Structural Violence: Structural
violence theorist, Farmer wrote: structural
violence describes “social arrangements that put
individuals and populations in harm’s way.”62
Mullen, structural violence theorist, echoes this
saying that structural violence is “built-in”
systemic vulnerability and dehumanization.63 I
argue that the psychological trauma and the
physical violence endured by survivors who
utilized the gacaca system demonstrates the
manifestation of structural violence in the form
of secondary victimization and punishment of
victims. While survivors were seeking justice
and resources through the restorative process,
they ultimately faced harm without any gained
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resources. As scholars asserted, these women
faced much greater harm than men who
testified. As the research demonstrated,
survivors experienced further violation of their
human rights following their testimony. While it
may seem that individual people are committing
interpersonal harm against the women, theorist
Kathleen Ho writes that total focus on
interpersonal violence obscures the underlying
causation of structural violence.64 Structural
violence theorists argue stigma unfolds within
contexts of inequitable power relations, and that
the stigma that shapes exclusion from social life
is rooted in structural processes rather than
individual attributes.65 Theorists have argued
that stigmatization is entirely contingent on
access to social, economic and political power
that allows the identification of differentness.66
In light of this, I argue then that if SV and the
act of speaking out against SV were not rooted
in structural violence in the form of unequal
power relations between survivors and nonvictims, the process would have been more
peaceful, and survivors would have experienced
less harm.
We witness the reinforcement structural
violence and further normalization through the
gacaca model as the harassment and
endangerment of survivors is not taken
seriously. I argue that stricter protective policies
that successfully held people accountable for
inflicting harm were necessary in order to
protect the survivors’ human rights. The
dichotomy present where survivors testified and
in the process had their human rights
compromised due to a lack of protective policy
and social stigma, suggest that the survivors are
the ones who bear the responsibility of the
crime when they testify.67 This is compounded
by the fact that perpetrators were often released
after survivors’ testimonies as part of the gacaca
model, causing distress in survivors while
providing power back to non-victims.68 In this
phenomenon, I argue structural violence is
reinforced as the non-victims are not held
responsible for their wrongdoings, a pivotal part
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of holding actors within structural violence
accountable.69 I argue that the lack of
accountability in the legal system and by the
government normalizes violent dynamics. Thus,
this phenonomon reinforces the power dynamic
of sexual violence, whereby women are
powerless, men hold the power, and there is the
silent actor of structural violence, normalizing
these dynamics.
Finally, the lack of distributive justice
suggests that it is acceptable for people who
were victims of SV to not receive medical care
and financial resources. Theorists argue that
poverty, as a form of structural violence, reveals
in the form of unemployment, lack of education,
healthcare, food, and shelter. This violence
inflicts suffering on members of society.
Especially for those with medical complications
following SV, the lack of resources causes
further harm to survivors as they are not able to
receive medical care. In this case, women were
forced to face death or the possibility of it when
they were unable to secure HIV treatment. This
preventable harm demonstrates structural
violence.70 In light of other theorists, I further
argue that a lack of resources reinforces
structural violence as it forces women to bear
the responsibility for men’s SV, thus
normalizing interpersonal violence against
women as well as women not having access to
necessary resources.71
PART II: Relevance of Structural Violence
within Isange in regards to SV Survivors:
Part II of this paper analyzes the short fallings
of Isange named by the UN, as listed in the
Introduction, and tested for the relevance of
structural violence. The data showed three
prominent themes. First, there was a lack of
confidence in the victor justice legal system that
currently stands. Staff expressed specific ways
in which the systematic forensic barriers and
cultural norms limit confidence in the legal
system. Second, the lack of resources results in
survivors not only experiencing the trauma of
sexual assault, but moreover, not being
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financially empowered to leave a dangerous
situation. Finally, there is a lack of collaboration
between MIGEPROF’s policy work and
Isange’s grassroots efforts. An analysis of the
shortcomings of Isange and the relevance of
structural violence allow for a broader
understanding of the ways in which structural
violence manifests.
A. Legal Barriers: Zero of the thirteen Isange
respondents reported legal justice as the
strongest method to address SV, showing low
levels of confidence in the legal avenue among
employees in terms of achieving punitive
justice. Importantly, the justice being sought
through the modern day court system in Rwanda
is focused on victor-punitive, aiming to punish
perpetrators because it is what they
“deserve.”72 This form of justice is often
powerful for survivors, as punishing
perpetrators can “offer victims the opportunity
to affirm the ‘wrongness’ of the crime
committed against them.”73 Moreover, punitive
justice is linked to deterrent justice, which is the
idea that “punishment is necessary, not simply
because perpetrators deserve it, but because it
should help discourage a convicted perpetrator
from committing another crime, for fear of
receiving punishment.”74 This model of justice
compares to the community-centered restorative
justice described earlier in gacaca.
Overall, 75% of staff interviewed
labelled similar constraints within the legal
sector. These include (1) social stigma that
caused a barrier for women to tracking abuse
through forensic evidence; ; (2) the inability to
track longevity of abuse.; (3) gender norms
within the courts; (4) lack of financial
redistribution. 100% of the doctors and
psychologists named the collection of forensic
evidence as a barrier. The evidence requires a
rape kit, and is necessary to build a strong case
against a perpetrator. It is essential for rape kits
to be collected while DNA is still available,
meaning before the survivor has bathed. 3 of the
13 staff and 2 of the 2 the ministry officers
attributed finances as a barrier. For instance, one
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doctor explained: “women need to be aware that
the Isange clinic has rape kits available, and
they must be able to go there during the clinic’s
workday.” 100% of the people interviewed
explained that there is serious stigma around the
topic of rape, and especially rape inflicted by an
intimate partner. One doctor said: “Many
believe that it is an issue that should stay within
the home, and many will not believe women
who claim to have been raped.” One police
officer validated this saying: “claiming rape
often means that women will face social
isolation and possibly lose economic
opportunities.” 75% of staff also alluded to the
overarching cultural reality impacting how legal
disputes are handled. One employee expressed
that federal and local courts make it difficult to
prosecute domestic and sexual abuse cases. He
explained: the courts are majority men, and
traditional, patriarchal marriage values remain,
where violence [is believed to be] a private
matter.
The data from Isange is supported by
other scholarly research in Rwanda. The UN
writes: “there are concerns over limited legal
assistance [in Rwanda] to victims owing to a
lack of forensic evidence to support cases in
courts and limited or delayed reporting of VAW
cases.75 Scholars found that the necessity of
forensic evidence leads to women’s hesitation
pressing charges. These scholars found that
women’s hesitation was entrenched in the belief
that gender violence should be kept within the
household.76 Literature supports the connection
between Rwanda’s culture of silence and the
hesitation around providing forensic evidence.
Scholars explain that many Rwandans still have
the culture of keeping family secrets to preserve
their family’s image, undermining their rights
and likeliness to report SV.77 Reinforcing the
culture of silence, scholars also explain male
back-lash patterns, whereby women experience
increased conflict within their relationships
when husbands felt their roles were challenged.
These back-lash patterns ultimately further
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undermine women’s capacity to seek legal
justice.78
The problems expressed within the
Rwandan context are not exception, and are
contextualized by a common theme within the
global pathology of sexual violence, where
stigma deters reporting. Scholars found that in
Nigeria, social stigmatization leads to underreporting and thus not collecting forensic
evidence. This scholar argues that the lack of
forensic evidence adversely affected the
prosecutions of perpetrators.79 In South Africa,
scholars found that survivors did not seek PREP
or report the violence because the fear of being
blamed and not receiving social support had
profound psychological impact.80 Scholars
reported that in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, up to 29% of survivors of sexual
violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) are rejected by their families and
communities.81 This stigmatization and
rejection undermines survivors willingness to
report violence following. Survivors of SV echo
this sentiment all over the world through local
press. In 2020, a news article in the United
Kingdom was published: “Sexual violence not
being reported by asylum seekers due to 'culture
of disbelief'.”82 A similar article was published
in Los Angelos, United States of America,
titled: “Rape victims: afraid to report crime;
problem for America is to eliminate the stigma
of reporting the trauma.”83 In Barhain, a news
article titled “Social stigma 'barrier to reporting
rape crimes'” was published in 2010.84 Though
further research would be necessary to draw
significant connections between Rwanda and
other contexts, this broad examination
demonstrates that Rwanda is not exceptional in
the struggles it faces regarding SV.
Beyond the minimal forensic evidence
report needed to pursue legal justice, research
suggests doubt of legal systems as an avenue to
correcting and ending SV. While Rwanda has
made significant strides including women in
decision making bodies, scholars have argued
that in Rwanda, “it is ‘too simple to assume that
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the participation of women will lead directly to
fundamental changes in itself and transform
“the hegemonic order of the legal system.”85
They assert that men’s roles as economic
providers and decision making authorities in the
household hold deep roots continuing to impact
legal processes.86 Additionally, in a policy and
legal analysis, scholars write that patriarchal
norms continue to produce gaps within the legal
system. They write:
Given that men have traditionally
controlled household assets and
resources, the recent (2013) law, which
provides equal ownership of land
between wives and husbands, has put
many women at risk of domestic
violence; their husbands can force them
to sign documents when they want to
sell land, and women who resist or
refuse were reported to experience
violence as a result.87
Burnet echoes the sentiment that despite
progress at the top, it is still quite difficult for
women to claim rights. She explains that strides
in gender policy conflict with entrenched
patriarchal attitudes that reflect a more
traditional society. This means that reforms do
not always stretch to all levels of society.88
Challenges accessing the legal system,
even with forensic evidence, is echoed in other
contexts that prosecute rape as well. In Nigeria,
the prosecution of rape is a very demanding
exercise, because beyond reliable evidence, the
case also needs witnesses. Given that the
perpetrator will often stop the violence when
someone walks in, finding a witness is difficult.
This scholar also reported that the police
indulge in poor investigational practices which
compromise the prosecution of cases.89
Additionally, health care scholars found that
despite the increasing implementation of
standardized rape kits across jurisdictions, the
medico-legal findings generated by these tools
are often not related to positive criminal justice
outcomes.90
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B. Lack of Resources: 100% of people
interviewed stated that there are no readjustment
services, including rehabilitation services and/or
safe homes. Since neither exists, survivors of
violence often return home to the abuse of their
partner. Staff explain that when the survivor is
economically dependent on her abuser, there is
a risk that she will need to continue to be
dependent on her abuser. 90% of the employees
advocate that abusers withdraw financial
support when a survivor reports him. Related to
resources, 100% staff expressed that there are
communication barriers limiting the work of
psychologists and lawyers. Staff explain that
communication is an important part of mental
health programming because treatment for
depression and PTSD takes time to complete.
Without the ability to adequately communicate,
psychologists cannot follow up with the
survivors. Additionally, survivors need to be
able to be easily reachable in order for their
lawyer to be able to work with them. Similar to
psychologists, without accessible
communication, lawyers are not able to properly
represent and work with their clients. The lack
of economic reintegration support as well as the
clinic’s inability to provide long-term succinct
treatment, make clear the ways in which the
clinic is not able to empower survivors long
term.
This argument is supported by other
scholars’ research. Literature cites that women
in low-income settings have reduced capacity to
leave violent situations due to dependence on a
husband for financial security.91 Economic
factors including women's unemployment,
homelessness, food and financial insecurity
have been found to constrain women's
responses, and ultimately, whether or not a
woman had a job was seen as a major factor
empowering her to leave a violent situation.
Moreover, reporting the violence led to negative
financial implications because the husband
would be put in jail, which would end his ability
to provide for his family, and thus lead to food
insecurity and homelessness.92 Other scholars
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support these arguments explaining that
resource-limited programs have limited capacity
to support survivors in obtaining safety, since
they do not have access to formal shelter
systems or emergency food networks.93 A
published article for the United Nations
advocates that the government of Rwanda needs
to continue to raise awareness of the fight
against violence against women, and follow up
on the socio-economic reintegration of
victims.94
C. The Tensions between Policy and Cultural
Norms: 100% of Isange staff were unaware of
MIGEPROF’s economic empowerment
initiative that promotes technical school
education for young women. Though this does
not directly relate to the health aspect of GBV,
economic inequalities are a driving force of
GBV. Perhaps, Isange and MIGEPROF could
collaborate on this initiative together. Nine of
the thirteen staff stated advocacy and
sensitization campaigns as a means to address
and end SV, showing great optimism in
community-wide efforts. That said, 100% of
staff interviewed did not know of any modernday campaign work addressing SV. This
compares to the 2 of the 2 ministry officers’
stated that there is a “zero tolerance” to GBV
across all sectors and an anti-GBV law which
provides severe punishment for all GBV policy.
Of course, as explained earlier, there are several
shortfallings to this legal policy.
The discrepancies within the Isange staff
responses and the MIGEPROF responses are
significant because they demonstrate a gap in
collaboration, and therefore a gap in ending SV.
Scholars advocate for close partnerships
between nonprofits and government agencies in
order to create gender equitable policies, and to
promote strong outcomes within agencies that
address SV.95 Close collaboration facilitates a
strong evidence base that supports policy,
practice, monitoring and evaluation at all levels.
Scholars advocate that close partnerships also
enable effective educational community wide
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campaign work, because bottom-up campaign
work allows for the roots of SV to be
addressed.96 For instance, involving men in
redefining masculinity in order to shift public
opinion about SV, rather than top-down
pressure on men to change their behaviors.97
The UN echoes this stating: widespread
messaging on GBV through community media
platforms ensures that the root causes of GBV
are directly targeted. Close collaboration allows
for cultural appropriateness. The UN advocates
that this messaging is therefore has been most
effectively done with all sectors of society
involved—from health providers to government
stakeholders.98
D. Relevance of Structural Violence I argue
that the gaps explored within Isange
demonstrate the manifestation of structural
violence. First, similar to during gacaca, where
women faced much greater harm than men who
testified, women are faced at a disposition in the
modern day when they pursue legal justice,
since harmful stigma continues to exist. In this
case, the stigma debilitates: due to this barrier,
women’s capacity to utilize the court system to
pursue safety is undermined. Through the
structural violence lens, I argue that this stigma
is rooted in structural processes rather than
individual attributes. As argued in Part D of Part
I, stigma is rooted in structural violence.99 In
light of this, I argue tthat if power structures
between survivors and non-victims were equal,
the act of speaking out against rape would not
cause stigmatization, and so the process would
be more peaceful, and survivors experience less
harm. While further data needs to be collected
on the intricacies of Rwanda’s legal system, I
argue that the lack of confidence in the legal
system demonstrates structural violence as well.
Farmer writes that structural violence manifests
as a lack of legal standing.100 Theorists DD
Winter and D.C Leighton write: “Structural
violence occurs whenever people are
disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or
cultural traditions.”101 The lack of confidence
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in the legal system, and the correspondent lack
of empowerment to utilize the legal system, as
well as the ways in which cultural traditions
inhibit women’s power all compromise
survivors’ legal standing. Therefore, structural
violence implicitly strips survivors of their
capacity to pursue legal justice.
I argue that the lack of economic
resources for survivors of SV also demonstrates
the manifestation of structural violence.
Theorists explain poverty, as a form of
structural violence, reveals in the form of
unemployment, lack of education, healthcare,
food, and shelter.102 This violence inflicts
suffering on members of society. In this case,
the survivors of SV experience this form of
structural violence as many are not able to
mobilize out of violence relationships due to a
lack of resources. With a lack of resources
present, and with women therefore needing to
accept abusers’ resources, inequitable gender
norms are normalized and reinforced. The lack
of resources therefore causes further harm to
women that is completely preventable, revealing
structural violence.103 Moreover, in light of
other theorists, I argue that similar to gacaca, a
lack of resources reinforces structural violence
as it forces women to bear the responsibility for
men’s SV. This ultimately leads to continued
harm against women and further normalizes
interpersonal violence against women.104
I argue that the lack of collaboration and
between Isange and the government and the
need for greater education reflect how society
allows structural violence through the form of
SV to continue to manifest. Drawing from
Galtung, structural violence is a social structure
that perpetuates inequality, thus causing
preventable suffering. Applying a structural
violence lens, I argue that social stratification—
systems where people who don’t have access to
things required to fulfil their needs—is at play
here. DD Winter and DC Leighton write:
“Because they are longstanding, structural
inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things
are and always have been.”105 Further research
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is needed to establish what is going on that is
causing the gaps in funding, such as whether it
is a lack of financial investment on behalf of the
Rwandan government or a lack of financial
investment by other stake-holders. Regardless, I
argue that the lack of collaboration and
grassroots campaign and education work
enables SV to continue to manifest. In this case,
the way society has been—where the
MIGEPROF and non-profits do not collaborate
to end SV, and where country-wide education is
not implemented—ultimately enables further
SV against women. There is not necessarily an
individual perpetrator to hold morally
responsible, but rather, the lack of collaboration
and grassroots support enables continued
vulnerability for women. These social
arrangements ultimately put individuals and
populations in harm's way, and therefore
demonstrate structural violence.106 Moreover, I
argue that the continued passivity enables the
normalization of violence against women,
thereby reinforcing structural violence.
Conclusion: This paper provided an in-depth
analysis of two government-sponsored
community organizations in Rwanda that
provide(ed) access to legal justice and resources
for survivors of SV. This paper analyzed the
ways in which unequal power dynamics have
manifested. While steps have been made in an
attempt to tackle the issue of SV against
women, gaps limit the extent to which structures
are truly affected. This structural violence
discussed consequently results in harm in
survivors’ social, economic, and health realities.
In line with Crenshaw’s theory of
intersectionality, women survivors’ of lower
class are particularly disadvantaged. This
disadvantage is rooted in structural violence
enabling the manifestation of patriarchal norms
that undermine women as well as structural
violence that limits access to opportunities
based on class. Further research is necessary to
test for the relevance of other manifestations of
structural violence in the organizations, such as
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white supremacism and homophobia.
Ultimately, Isange and gacaca provide us with
further context in order to understand overall
themes present within the global pathology of
SV. Going forward, in order to make strides
within this pathology that is entrenched in
structural violence, there is a clear need for
preventable problems to be examined. Isange
and gacaca provide insight into the ways in
which survivor-centered support, educational
campaigns, coordination between Government
ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and
the allocation of further resources could be
utilized to better tackle the issue of SV.
In imagining the approach to ending SV,
whether in our own US communities or in
global communities, understanding the role of
structural violence allows us to strategically
target powerful forces operating within the
institution of family, state, and civil society.107
According to the theory of structuration, group
action plays into the dynamic relationship
between societal members and overarching
structures.108 Whether in Rwanda or
elsewhere, there is a need to determine how
both internal and external agents can be used to
challenge structure violence, and therefore
empower victims of it, and ideally, motivate and
inspire political will that reduces the harm
perpetrated by it.109 I argue then that the
naming of the relevance of structural violence,
enables the opportunity to re-imagine how SV
issues are approached, and will allow for
stronger community organization. This will
therefore help to cultivate necessary pressure on
overarching structures that will assist in
revolutionizing the global SV pathology.110
Where structural violence is relevant, we know
that preventable problems manifest. Through
structuration, we have the capacity to address
these problems —on large and small scales—
ultimately providing opportunity to improve the
pathology of SV, and reduce physical, mental,
social, and economic harm experienced by
survivors.
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The Intersectional
Experience of Ndi
Umunyarwanda: An
Interdisciplinary
Analysis of Identity &
Removing Ubwoko
in Rwanda
ROZLYN M. PARADIS
Abstract
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: These
different amoko (“kinds” in Kinyarwanda) have
shaped Rwandans’ identities for centuries.
Modern components include post-genocide
identities and the individuals’ degree of
Rwandaness. Through 11 in-field interviews
conducted in 2017, Rwandans’ experience of
the Ndi Umunyrwanda program was analyzed
through the intersections of these identities. The
“I am Rwandan” program was a governmentsponsored, nationalistic campaign that promoted
similarities in response to the Genocide against
the Tutsi in 1994. It removed amoko from the
public sphere for the sake of unity which,
through this paper, was proven detrimental to
vulnerable intersects of Rwandans.
1

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become
Killers (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 2001).
2
“Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country,”
United Nations, accessed October 2, 2018,
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/e
ducation/rwandagenocide.shtml
3
“Independence,” The World Fact Book, CIA,
accessed September 30, 2018.
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Introduction
Rwanda has faced decades of conflict between
three groups of Rwandans: the Abahutu,
Abatutsi and Abatwa, which cumulated in 1994
with the Genocide against the Tutsi. Belgians
colonized Rwanda in 1916 and enacted a
“divide and rule” form of domination. The
colonizers favored Abatutsi in government and
education while synonymizing the Hutu identity
with “second-hand citizens.” The Abahutu were
85 percent of the Rwandan population and, in
the 1950’s began to use that to their advantage.1
Violence sparked as Abahutu rose up and killed
hundreds of Abatutsi, marking the Hutu
Revolution lasting from 1959 to 1961. This
period signified the end of Tutsi domination and
increase tension between the Hutu and Tutsi.2
In the wake of the Hutu Revolution and
as other countries announced independence (i.e.
Congo independence in 1960 from Belgium and
Tanzania in 1962 from British control), the
Belgians quickly switched support in favor of
the majority: the Abahutu. On July 1, 1962,
Rwanda became an independent state.3 The
Abahutu used their power to continue
marginalization of Abatutsi, eventually leading
to the official peace agreement, the Arusha
Peace Accords in 1991. This agreement aimed
to make peace between the Hutu-led
government of Rwanda and the predominatelyTutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).4 During
the 100 short days of the Genocide against the
Tutsi in April 1994, the United Nations

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2088.html.
4
“Peace Agreement between the Government of
the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese
Patriotic Front,”
Document Retrieval, United Nations, accessed
October 2, 2018,
https://peacemaker.un.org/rwandapeaceagreementrpf93.
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officially reports more than 800,0005 Rwandans
were slaughtered by machete; the National
Commission for the Fight Against the Genocide
(CNGL) in Rwanda states 1,070,014 deaths.6
Rwanda looks toward a peaceful future
and sets outs to heal from the atrocities that had
plagued the country for decades. Numerous
grass roots and government-sponsored programs
have worked to encourage forgiveness and
create peace in the country.
Soon after the genocide ended, the
country sought justice for victims and victims’
families through a traditional, grass roots form
of community healing: the Gacaca Courts. In
Gacaca Courts proceedings, which were led by
respected community leaders, “priority was
given to Rwanda reconciliatory norms and
values, namely admission, repentance, apology
and forgiveness.”7 In order to modernize and
adapt to the more serious crimes which Gacaca
Courts were being adapted for, an added form of
punishment was introduced.
If perpetrators share their whole truth
including the wrongdoings they committed as
well as any other wrongdoings they had
knowledge of, they were rewarded with half
their prison sentence, with the rest spent in
Travail d’Interest Generale (TIG; “works of
general service”). TIG was a restorative
alternative to imprisonment that focused on
rebuilding: physically rebuilding the

communities that were destroyed and rebuilding
mindsets through educational programs,
destroying genocidal ideologies and promoting
reintroduction into society.
Compulsory, government-led introduced
and led programs like Ubudehe, Umunganda
and Ndi Umunyarwanda8 provided opportunity
for community-centered reconciliation, support
and self-reliance. Ubudehe was introduced as
village-level community work “targeted at
general poverty alleviation buil[t] on traditional
practices of communal crop planting or house
building – and is thus labelled ‘a homegrown
solution rooted in Rwanda's culture’ (NURC
2007: 96)”9 Similarly, Umunganda began to
provide government-required, monthly
communal work supporting the community. The
work could include cleaning public spaces,
filling potholes or building roads, maintaining
drainage, planting flowers and more.
To complement the actioned-based
programs outlined above, is Ndi
Umunyarwanda.
Ndi Umunyarwanda is a nationalistic unity
campaign that emphasizes a pre-colonial
Rwandan identify over anything else,
specifically targeting an override on one’s
ubwoko (ubwoko means “kind” in Kinyarwanda,
in this context it is the categorization of Hutu,

5

9

United Nations, “Rwanda: A Brief History of
the Country.”
6
“Background,” National Commission for the
Fight Against the Genocide, accessed August
17, 2018,
http://www.cnlg.gov.rw/genocide/background/?
L=0
7
Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts,
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 43.
8
Ndi Umunyarwanda (n-də oo-mo͞on-ē-ruhWAHN-duh) translates to “I am Rwandan”

29

“Becoming Rwandan? The Impact of Two
Decades of Unity Policies on the Batwa,”
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, the
Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
and Tilburg University, the Netherlands,
accessed July 12, 2020,
http://www.kaowarsom.be/documents/PDF%20
BULLETIN/GOODWIN.pdf; “The National
Policy on Unity and Reconciliation,” Republic
of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission, 2007, accessed August, 29, 2018,
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=70&no_c
ache=1&tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid %5D
=26.
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Tutsi or Twa, defined in more detail later).10
This program emphasized that the most
important part of one’s identity is their
Rwandaness. It not only emphasizes similarities
and denounces difference but simultaneously
calls upon Hutu individuals to apologize for the
actions of their ancestors, something that will be
described more in depth later in the paper.
As nationality is emphasized, the Ndi
Umunyarwanda program and other
reconciliation efforts fail to support other
intersections of Rwandans’ identities, the
hundreds of other components that create
unique experiences. Intersectionality is the
study of the interconnected nature of all the
components of identity and social categorization
working together to create these experiences.
These categories include (but are not limited to)
race, class and gender and individuals can move
between different categories and the boundaries
of each category can adjust over time to include
more or different individuals. Some parts of
identity cannot be separated from others,
creating a mutually inclusive experience. The
Ndi Umunyarwanda program will be analyzed
through 11 in-field interviews under the lens of
intersectionality and mutual inclusivity to create
a full understanding of different people’s
experiences with the program and its overall
effectiveness.
Research Methodology: Existing literature,
theories and insights from multiple disciplines
evaluated individual experiences with the Ndi
Umunyarwanda program. The main source of
data comes from eleven in-field interviews
which were conducted over three weeks in April
and May of 2017. Eight interviews were done in
Kigali, Rwanda and three in Butare, Rwanda.
The interviewees consisted of local academics,
political officials and general citizens. The three
groups were chosen to gain perspective on the

way ethnicity was being taught, how it affected
leaderships and how it was perceived at the
citizen level. The individuals discussed identity
politics in 30- to 120-minute informal, semistructured interviews. These individuals were
interviewed on the basis of understanding what
ethnicity meant to them on a personal or
profession-based level and observed political
and cultural implications of these identities.
Eight of the interviews were conducted
in English; three in Kinyarwanda. The interview
in Kinyarwanda conducted in Butare, Rwanda
was translated by a professor, Dr. Bernard
Rutikanga while the two interviews conducted
in Kigali were translated by a trilingual student,
Margot Manuella. Interviewees gave permission
to be recorded which were later transcribed and
analyzed with ethnographic research methods
and from a symbolic interactionist perspective.
After demographic questions and relevant
background information (as identified by the
informant), the informant was asked to define
how they understood the term “ethnicity.”
Individuals answered with definitions, personal
statements and historical recaps of the terms’
usage in Rwanda. Following, interview
questions were taken from a prepared list. The
informants had not seen the questions before the
interview. Interviews were fluid and the
informant directed the conversation with their
answers. An example list of prepared questions
is included in the appendix.
Taboo’s surrounding the Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa identities were respected as these terms can
be offensive or triggering to individuals. One’s
ubwoko (kind, or again, in this context the Hutu,
Tutsi or Twa categorization) affiliation was
never assumed, guessed or questioned directly.
Based on the subject of the interviews being
ethnicity, it was often disclosed organically then
attached to the respondent’s ideologies.

10

Victor Visathan, “‘Ndi Umunarwanda,’
concept should be a legacy for posterity,” New
Times, March 26, 2015.
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The two essential components in this
study are ubwoko and post-genocide identities.
The strength of Rwandan identity will be noted
during the analysis of the interviews. Age is a
variable that is only used to differentiate those
alive during the genocide from those born after.
Although class, political affiliation and
occupation could correlate with one’s ubwoko
and post- genocide identity, for simplification,
these will not be evaluated. Gender is not
addressed due to the lack of representation in
the sample group.
Limitations: Budget, time and travel all posed
limitations. As an undergraduate student
studying abroad, time was limited to two
months of preparation, three weeks of
interviewing and one month of in-country
analysis. Positionality of the interviewer and the
official government stance on this topic
assuredly impacted responses. Ten of the 11
interviewees were men and no one interviewed
identified as Twa. Travel limitations only
allowed for interviews in two cities in Rwanda:
Kigali and Butare. Both cities played key roles
in the conflict as violence initially erupted in
Kigali and reports suggest the most extensive
slaughter in Butare. In 1994 and at the time of
the interviews, Kigali and Butare were the
largest cities in Rwanda granting it’s citizens
easier access to public resources, education and
political supervision.
Limitations are important to note to
qualify potential response bias and the note the
sample was not representative of all
intersections. This research is the beginning to
further research on experience with this
program, as it is not expansive to all Rwandans.
These limitations do not discredit this research
because it only analyzes the intersections that
11

Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak,
Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory
(Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2017), 93.
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are represented and do not discuss experiences
based off of gender. Overall this research is
credible within its scope.
Interdisciplinarity: The evaluation of the
individual experience with the Ndi
Umunyarwanda in Rwanda satisfies all
conditions calling for interdisciplinarity as
outlined by Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak: it
is complex, requires two or more disciplines
offering insights and works to explain an
unresolved societal problem.11
For example, understanding the
individual’s experience with the Ndi
Umunyarwanda program is complex: including
the concept of identity, intersectionality,
defining and removing ubwoko, understanding
the Ndi Umunyarwanda program and evaluating
the words of Rwandans. Many disciplines are
consulted to understand these complexities but
the volume of literature on specific to the
program is limited due to the program’s young
age. Anthropological studies, historical
explanations and political science
rationalizations attempt to justify ideologies of
the Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa identities but
remains incomplete and contradictory, leaving
the understanding of Rwandan identity
unsolved. Written literature on the program is
sparse and field interviews gather testimonies
from genocidal experience more often than the
post-genocide era.12 There is a hole in academic
understanding that can be filled through this
analysis.

Complexities and Themes
Identity, Intersectionality and Mutual
Inclusivity: Identity is complex; it is composed
of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, dis/ability,
12

See Phillip Gourevitch, We wish to inform
you that tomorrow we will be killed with our
families: Stories from
Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1998).
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age, religion, socioeconomic status, political
affiliation, power domain, family status,
occupation and more.13 Based in sociology,
identity is socially constructed: a person cannot
be separated from the people, historical events
and social circumstances that surrounds them,
particularly through socialization and the social
groups within which one identifies. The
plurality of social groups intersects, making
unique circumstances for all individuals, the
main premise of intersectionality.
Intersectionality is a method of
analyzing the immense complexities in human
experience through axis of social division and
complex discrimination.14 Different social
belongings do not create identities that are
“alternatives but combinations.”15 These layers
of identity “operate not as discrete and mutually
exclusive entities but build on each other and
work together.”16
The intersections of identity are cohesive
facets to one’s being and experience. For
example, a black woman can never disassociate
between her gender and her race; every
experience she has is a combination of the
two— as black and as a woman.17 For this
person, these two parts of identity are mutually
inclusive. Mutual inclusivity relates to this

study: For example, a Hutu bystander can never
have an experience as just a Hutu (ubwoko) or
just a bystander (post-genocide identity), they
will always be both and their lived experiences
and ideologies will reflect that combination.
Over time, boundaries of groups are
dynamic: they eb and flow to include or exclude
others, often through the constant developing
and overlapping intersectional identities and
shared experiences identities and shared
experiences.18 The multiple dimensions and
understandings of human experiences are
unique to an individual and can also expand
across a group of individuals who have the same
or similar intersections and create dialogue
between different intersections. In other cases, it
can cause mistrust, blame and stagnation.19
In the context of Rwanda, “‘Hutu’ and
‘Tutsi’ are ancient terms with changing
meanings; terms that diachronically (across
time) evolve and synchronically (at a point in
time) polyvalent.”20 The two essential
components of identity for this study are
ubwoko and post-genocide identities, which
over time have flowed into overlapping and
mutual inclusive duos.

13

17

David Newman, Sociology: Exploring the
architecture of everyday life. (Los Angeles:
SAGE Publications,
2014).
14
Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge,
Intersectionality (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2016).
15
Caroline Andrew, “Multiculturalism, gender,
and social cohesion: Reflections on
intersectionality and urban citizenship in
Canada.” In Insiders and outsiders: Alan Cairns
and the reshaping of Canadian Citizenship, ed.
Philip Resnick & Gerald Kernerman
(Vancouver: U of British Columbia P, 2005),
317.
16
Collins and Bilge, Intersectionality
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 4.
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Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the margins:
Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence
against women of color,” Stanford Law Review
43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241-1299.
18
Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic
Groups and Boundaries, ed. Fredrik Barth
(Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1969).
19
Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and
Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide
in Rwanda." Peace Review 15, no., 3 (2003):
287-94.
20
Andrea Purdeková, ““Building a nation in
Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its discontents,”
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 8 no. 3
(December 2008): 512.
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Ubwoko: Ubwoko is pertinent to identity and
references Hutu, Tutsi and Twa categorization.21
The Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa were
historically perceived to be widely different
from one another.22 These “differences” were
exacerbated by colonial rule and shaped
individual experience, determining the fate of
their descendants.
As once a distinction of profession and
wealth—the Abatutsi were wealthy pastoralists,
the Abatwa poor forest dwellers and the
Abahutu were agriculturalists somewhere in
between—ubwoko evolved to being much
more.23 Observed differences between these
groups were well recorded and diverse,
including height, weight, nose size, skin color,
lactose in/tolerance and more.24
Before colonization, amoko was
associated with one’s clan.25 During and after,
the term became synonymous to the Abahutu,
Abatutsi and Abatwa categorization.26 Ubwoko
is translated as ethnicity, genre, tribe and type,
but the most authentic translation from
Kinyarwanda to English is “kind.” Every noun
in Kinyarwanda has a “kind,” as described by
Informant IX in an interview conducted by the
author in Kigali on May 3, 2017:
Ethnicity, if you try to put it into
Kinyarwanda, it is called ubwoko. And
everything, it has ubwoko – even
21

Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbors: Webs of
violence in Rwanda (Ithica: Cornell University
Press, 2009).
22
See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers;
Newbury, “Ethnicity”; Purdeková, ““Building,”;
Straub, Pearlman and Miller, “Healing the roots
of genocide in Rwanda”; Vansina, “The
politics,” 37-44.
23
See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers;
Amini Jean de Dieu Ngabonziza, “The
Importance of Language
Studies in Conflict Resolution.” Journal of
African Conflicts and Peace Studies 2, no. 1
(September 2013). White, “An African,” 40-46.
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animals, computers – when you try to
translate ubwoko into English, the
meaning is not ethnicity, it is kind . . .
This pen has ubwoko, this computer has
ubwoko, this guy has ubwoko. It is
confusing, it could mean different
things.
Informant IX continues to discuss the confusion
that began when Rwanda was colonized:
But when the colonials came here, they
brought ethnicity with its meaning of
same culture, same background but here
it was different…It was one people with
one culture, we speak the same
language. It means that, if we take the
real meaning of ethnicity, our ethnic
group should be Rwandanism – not Hutu
and Tutsi. But people confused “kind”
and “ethnicity.” We used to say we have
three groups, which is based on the truth.
[Three ethnicities are not based on
truth.] But genocide happened because
of this confusion of ethnicities.
As described by Informant IX,
colonizing Belgians noticed differences and
labeled Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups.
The Westernized concept of ethnicity was
directly applied to these groups.27
Differentiating one’s “kind” as one’s “ethnicity”
24

See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers;
Dean White, “An African Holocaust,” History
Today 64, no. 6 (June 2014): 40-46; Aimable
Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity,
Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide,
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
2003).
25
Ubwoko, singular, means “kind;” amoko,
plural, means “kinds.”
26
Fujii, Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in
Rwanda.
27
Wielenga, “‘Lived,’” 122-136.
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brought different implications to Rwandans: An
ethnic group consists of people who share
human behavior and culture. This gives
members a sense of belonging to the ethnic
group through shared practices, traditions and
rituals.28 Far and wide, ethnicity is described as
a common culture, language, region, values and
beliefs.29 This definition was confirmed as a
belief by multiple informants, specifically
Informant V, interviewed by the author in
Kigali on April 26, 2017: “Ethnicity is, I
consider, as beliefs, cultures and perspectives
that define a certain section of people. That
brings them together and determines who the
people of that section are and their origins.”
When asked, however, how this applies
to the differences between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
categorizations, the vital notions of “ethnicity”
and “ubwoko” were lost in translation. It was
quickly denounced by Informant X, interviewed
in Kigali on May 3, 2017, that Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa were ethnically different:

arguments, it must be stated: “ethnic diversity is
socially articulated and maintained.”32 Belgians
imposed their concept of ethnicity onto
Rwandan culture and emphasized social
difference between the “kinds.” After
independence, the Rwandan government
maintained the groups as ethnicities. The social
hierarchy was cemented and maintaining this
“ethnic diversity” served as the path of least
resistance for society’s continuation.33
Barth emphasizes ethnicity is not

No. Absolutely no. I think that here, the
context of Rwanda does not have this
ethnicity. How would you define people
that are speaking one language, they
don’t have a second language, they have
one culture, they have one
leadership? … How would you explain
to me that, you know? … But in
Rwanda, [different ethnicities?] No way.
No way!30

concrete categorization based on promordial
blood lines, but is dynamic human collection
seen as “a population which … has a
membership which identifies itself, and is
identified by others, as constituting a category
distinguishable from other categories of the
same order.”34 Hutu, Tutsi and Twa fell into this
definition: the populations identified themselves
and could identify others, and were
distinguishable through physical appearance,
economic status or association.

The argument proposed by informants is
confirmed in existing literature.31 Despite these
28

Barth, “Introduction.”
White, “An African,” 40-46.; Wielenga,
“‘Lived,’” 122-136; Straub, Pearlman and
Miller, “Healing the roots of genocide in
Rwanda”; Mamdani, When Victims Become
Killers.
30
Informant X, interview by author, Kigali,
Rwanda, May 3, 2017.
31
See White, “An African,” 40-46;
Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham.
29

34

Figure 1: Post-Genocide Identities

Term
survivor
perpetrator
bystander
Refugee
Rescuer
not born

Definition

Ubwoko Affiliation

any Tutsi who survived

Tutsi

individual who victimized
the Abatutsi
were not victims, did not add
to or stop victimization
individual who fled from
1959 to 1994
individual who helped
Abatutsi survive

Hutu,
sometimes Twa
Hutu,
Twa

those born after July 1, 1994

Rwandan

Tutsi
Hutu,
sometimes Twa

32

Harald Eidheim, “When ethnic identity is a
social stigma,” in Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries, ed. Fredrik Barth
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969),
39.
33
Eidheim, “When ethnic,” 39; see White, “An
African,” 40-46; Mamdani, When Victims
Become Killers; Fujii,
Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda.
34
Barth, “Introduction,” 11.

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol3/iss2/1

34

et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship Volume III Issue

Though, the non-social or economic
status distinguishable traits were the ones
exacerbated and misinformed by colonial rule.
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were reified from a fluid
categorization of class to biological differences
based on physical generalizations which
resulted in a socially constructed division
deemed “ethnic.” Falsely using the term
“ethnicity” allowed colonists to skirt
responsibility for the division, while
successfully executing their “divide and rule”
methodology to gain control of a population that
was once in, at the very least, peaceful
coexistence.
Regardless of the ethnicity debate, Hutu,
Tutsi and Twa identities are significant to the
history of Rwanda and to individual experience.
Therefore, the term ubwoko alleviates confusion
with definitions of ethnicity and best highlights
the differences between the groups without
imposing Western ideologies or emphasizing
misinterpreted values.35 Ubwoko allows a more
honest evaluation of their current implications,
especially in relation to lived experiences with
Ndi Umunyarwanda, a program that seeks
unification through the erasure of the Hutu,
Tutsi and Twa identities.
Post-Genocide Identities: Another sect of
Rwandan identity are post-genocide identities.
There are six post-genocide identities used
based on informants: survivors, perpetrator,
bystander, refugee, rescuer and those not born.
Identities were prescribed to individuals based
upon involvement in the Genocide against the
Tutsi. They are outlined in Figure 1: PostGenocide Identities.

35

Sigrun Marie Moss, “Beyond Conflict and
Spoilt Identities: How Rwandan Leaders Justify
a Single Recategorization Model for PostConflict Reconciliation,” in Journal of Social
and Political Psychology 2, no. 1 (2014): 435–
449; Moss and Vollhardt, “‘You Can’t.”

35

The categories are defined as follows: A
survivor survived the genocide; to officially be
recognized by the Rwandan government as a
survivor, the individual can only be Tutsi (not
Hutu or Twa). A perpetrator committed acts of
genocide (ideation, vandalism, rape, murder,
etc.). Bystanders were not victims nor added or
prevented the victimization of Abatutsi.
Refugees fled Rwanda during the official
beginning of the conflict in 1959 through the
end of the genocide in 1994. A rescuer saved
Abatutsi victims. Finally, those who were
categorized as unborn were born after July 1,
1994.
The affiliation of post-genocide
identities with historic ubwoko create
complexities (see final column in Figure 1:
Post-Genocide Identities). Ubwoko is prohibited
from applications for education, government
office or employment. In contrast, postgenocide identities are not forbidden and can
actually grant or deny access to certain
resources like health care and welfare for
survivors.36 While Abatutsi/survivors are
receiving healthcare benefits, all Abahutu are
presumed to have been perpetrators.37 Ubwoko
was eliminated from government discourse to
avoid inequalities and stigmatization but postgenocide identities creates different treatment
and are directly aligned with ubwoko.
Between individuals in modern-day
Rwanda “[all] parties try to behave as if
ethnicity ‘does not count.’”38 Despite their
behavior, “[Rwandans] caution that ethnicity is
as present as ever in Rwanda. They believe that
if Rwandans do not use the words ‘Tutsi’ and
‘Hutu,’ it is because they have found other ways
of saying them.”39 Another way to say them in
36

“Health and Social Welfare,” Republic of
Rwanda, accessed April 14, 2018,
http://gov.rw/about-the- government/health-andsocial-welfare/
37
See Eidheim, “When ethnic.”
38
Eidheim, “When ethnic,” 54.
39
Mbaraga, “State pushes.”
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and development. The program
encompasses both the atrocities of the
divisive past and the hope for a
peaceful, reconciled and reunited
country. Not all Rwandans need settle
on a single interpretation, but the task
is to work toward mutually acceptable
accommodation. Ndi Umunyarwanda
program is such a normative shift. By
focusing on a shared citizenship –
citizenship as a shared fate – the
program restores the bond and
solidarity between Rwandans.”42

through these post-genocide identities which
follow ubwoko lines consistently.
These intersections of identity create
multiple lenses of experience with the Ndi
Umunyarwanda program. The complexities
discussed in this section are pertinent to the
unique experiences Rwandans have had with the
program.
Understanding the Ndi Umunyarwanda
program’s situation: The understanding of the
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was synthesized
from multiple sources. There is no official
English version describing the program and
literature surrounding the topic is limited.
Ndi Umunyarwanda was conceived at a
Youth Connekt event in 2013 and officially
launched and adopted as a national campaign by
the National Unity of Reconciliation Committee
(NURC) within months.40 and under it,
President Kagame “called for young adults of
Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide
committed ‘in their name’ by their parents and
relatives.”41
According to the NURC, the program is
described as follows:
“[Ndi Umunyarwanda ] provides a
forum or space for Rwandans in
various social groups to discuss issues
related to national unity, reconciliation
40

Robert Mbaraga, “State pushes campaign that
critics say it is ethnically divisive,” The East
African, November
16, 2013,
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/rwanda/News/
Mixed-reactions-to--Ndi-Umunyarwandainitiative/1433218-2075366-cjnwygz/index.html.
41
Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts,
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44.
42
Republic of Rwanda, “The National Policy on
Unity and Reconciliation,” 112.
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The program, as described above,
encapsulates much of the public knowledge
known about this program. As commented on
by other scholars, details and descriptions of the
program are scarce. Information translated into
English is nearly nonexistent. 43
The information that we have, however,
can be discussed more in depth. First and
foremost, the program calls “for young adults of
Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide
committed ‘in their name’ by their parents and
relatives” which perpetuates a culture of
apology established with the modernized
Gacaca Courts, as previously discussed. 44 Since
Hutu perpetrators were in the spotlight of these
events, they did not have the analytical freedom

43

See Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the
politics of history in Rwanda.” Africa Today 45,
no. 1 (Jan. – Mar. 1998); Jan Vansina, “The
politics of history and the crisis in the Great
Lakes,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (March 1998):
37-44.; “Geography,” Republic of Rwanda, last
modified 2017, http://gov.rw/home/geography/;
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda,
“Becoming Rwandan?”
44
Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts,
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44.
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to understand the contents of the programs and
were only expected to confess and apologize.
Furthermore, although the program
called for a forum for Rwandans to establish an
agreed upon history and speak openly about the
problems that have resulted from it, details of
how the Ndi Umunyarwanda program is
executed is vague.45 The implementation of this
nation-building encourages discussion and “a
deep, ‘experiential’ understanding” for their
participants of the past and their re-socialized
identities.”46 However, through conversations it
appears that the program is concretely built
around “a series of messages drawn up by the
NURC and communicated in the context of
other programmes…[and] also within the
compulsory public meetings that take place at
village level. These descriptions portray this
communication as less a dialogue than a topdown lesson on what it is to be Rwandan
today.”47
The top-down dialogue works to make
“people believe a story of the past they are not
allowed to contribute to.”48 The messaging
within this story establishes “a shared moral
atrocity of members of the Hutu community,”

furthering othering and villianizing the Hutu
perpetrators.49
Ironically, with its emphasis on Hutu
accountability, another of its objectives was to
emphasize Rwandan identity over everything
else and remove the use of one’s ubwoko in the
official, public sphere. “If ethnic hatred was to
be overcome and further violence prevented, it
was necessary to replace ethnic division with
something else.”50 Through national unity, the
program worked to shift belonging from
ubwoko to national identity and centered around
“Rwanda’s moral values and Rwandan spirit”
and “the replac[ement] of ethnic identity with
civic identity.”51 An Executive Summary
sponsored by the Rwandan government states
that the program “is perceived as an effective
mechanism to rehabilitate Rwandanity.”52
However, many scholars beg to differ.
This program’s legitimacy is “highly
criticized” and questioned by many Western
scholars and other populations.53 It is said to be
built on fabricated unity that minimizes
differences between Rwandans and “the
emphasis on national unity has been used as a
tool by the RPF-based elite for entrenching their

45

African, August 3, 2013,
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/Rwanda/News/I
nitiators-officials-defend-genocide-forgivenesscampaign-//1433218/1935194/-/kbvl1az/-/index.html; See
M., 2013; Romeo Rugero, “Hutu Manifesto
2016,” Ishyaka Komunisti ryu Rwanda.
2016.
http://communistpartyofrwanda.tumblr.com/pos
t/134192407498/hutu-manifesto-2016; Bret
Ingelaere, “The ruler’s drum and the people’s
shout: Accountability and representation on
Rwanda’s hills,” in Remaking Rwanda: State
building and human rights after mass violence,
ed. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison,
WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011)
67-78.

Mbaraga, “State pushes.”
Ervin Straub, Laurie Anne Pearlman and
Vachel Miller, “Healing the roots of genocide in
Rwanda,” Peace
Review 15, no. 3 (2003): 290.
47
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda,
“Becoming Rwandan?” 4.
48
Purdeková, ““Building,”; 512.
49
Kavuro, “Gacaca Courts,” 44.
50
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda,
“Becoming Rwandan?” 1.
51
Cori Wielenga, “‘Lived’ Identities in
Rwanda: Beyond Ethnicity?” African Insight,
44, no. 1 (June 2014): 122136; Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts,” 44.
52
Rwandan Government. Executive Summary:
Ndi Umunyarwanda Evaluation, 2017.
53
Edmund Kagire, “Initiators, officials defend
genocide forgiveness campaign,” The East
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power… silencing opposition voices in the
name of national unity.”54 Sigrun Marie Moss
claims intersectional differences are ignored as
“the Rwandan government’s recategorization
policy involves (psychologically) dissolving the
subordinate groups rather than improving
relations between those groups.”55
The psychological dissolve of these
groups, however, only happens in the public
sphere. The efforts of deemphasizing ubwoko
has rather shifted emphasis, making it taboo to
speak about in public but the conversations
continue in private and only within like-minded
Figure 2:
Informant Intersections
Tutsi survivor

III, VII

Hutu perpetrator

IV, VI

Hutu bystander
Tutsi refugee

IX
V, X, XI

Hutu rescuer

I

unborn Rwandan

II

unknown

VIII

circles, stagnating growth and perpetuating
othering. In the effort to impose unity, this
programs and others that complement it have
actually made ubwoko more salient while
simultaneously “driving it underground.”56
54

Janine Natalya Clark, “National unity and
reconciliation in Rwanda: A flawed approach?”
Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 28, no. 2 (May
2010); Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf,
“Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state,”
in Remaking Rwanda: State building and human
rights after mass violence, ed. Scott Straus and
Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 2011); Communauté des
Potiers du Rwanda, “Becoming Rwandan?” 1.
55
Sigrun Marie Moss, and Johanna Ray
Vollhardt, “‘You Can’t Give a Syringe with
Unity’: Rwandan Responses to the
Government’s Single Recategorization
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The program is praised by the Rwandan
government, survivors seeking peace,
perpetrators pursuing acceptance and those born
after genocide fighting for reconciliation. An
example of this praise can be seen through a
statement by Hon. Stanislas Kamanzi:
[The] Ndi Umunyarwanda program
helps us to fight against anyone and
anything that may want to take us back.
It helps us to understand that being
Rwandan doesn’t mean having the
Rwandan nationality but being proud of
the Rwandan identity and committed to
work hard for the development of your
Country.57
Results and Analysis:
The 11 informants represented six
intersections of ubwoko and post-genocide
identities (see Figure 2: Informant
Intersections.58) Informant VIII did not disclose
either intersect, therefore is categorized as
“unknown.” The categories include: Tutsi
survivor, Hutu perpetrator, Hutu bystander,
Tutsi refugee, Hutu rescuer and Rwandan born
post- genocide. All informants identified as
Rwandan, but emphasis differed along the
ubwoko divisions. For example, refugee
Informants V, X and XI and survivors III and
VII identified as Rwandans but unashamedly
Policies,” in Analyses of Social Issues and
Public Policy 16, no. 1
(November 2015): 436.
56
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda,
“Becoming Rwandan?” 1.
57
“REMA staff members in a dialogue about
‘Ndi Umunyarwanda’ Program,” Press Room,
Rwanda Environment
Management Authority (REMA), last modified
November 12, 2013,
http://www.rema.gov.rw/index.php?id=10&tx_t
tnews%5Btt_news%5D=71&cHash=1dfabefcf7
7a99b156d24e9f
24f632e9.
58
See Appendix A: Demographics of Informants
for details on each informant.
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identified as Abatutsi. Informants IV, VI and IX
self-identified as historically Hutu but
passionately proclaimed themselves now as
Rwandans. They all were eager to discuss how
all people in Rwanda are Rwandans and did not
spend time discussing individual ubwoko,
emphasizing that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were
gone.
The interviews were grouped by the
informants’ intersection of ubwoko and postgenocide identity and analyzed. To see more
context regarding each informant including age,
sex and occupation, please see Appendix A:
Demographic of Informants.

going to doubt my
cleanliness as far as the
genocide is concerned. If I
say I am a Hutu people will
start saying, ‘oh what were
you doing back in the
genocide, were you part of
it?’ It still has that kind of
stain and stigma on
[amoko].60

Tutsi Survivor: Two informants –
Informant III and VII – identified as male, Tutsi
survivors over 50 years of age. Informant III
discussed his experience as an academic and
Informant VII shared his personal experiences.
Informant III immediately stated that
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are not different
ethnicities: “They would be best described as
social classes or occupations… The differences
were created: colonization. The differences
which had to do with stereotyping of behavior…
by the Belgians.”59 According to Informant VII,
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are subcultures within the
Rwandan culture. Both informants expressed
stigmatized views of the Abatwa.
Informant VII believes ubwoko
identification is dying but not dead. He
discussed the stigma and meanings of ubwoko in
modern Rwanda:
It doesn’t mean much really;
some people still cling to it.
They’d like to see that they
are identified by them. But it
has a meaning in the sense
that if I say I am a Tutsi at
least I know nobody is

In contrast, Informant III states: “no
body today would be harassed or
discriminated against because of what he
is.”61 Instead the government provided each
Rwandan what they need: the Twa received
support (Informant III compared it to
Affirmative Action), survivors got medical
care and new homes, and perpetrators were
reeducated to fight genocide ideology.
Overall, the two informants felt
encouraged by the conversation on ubwoko.
According to Informant VII, “[Being
Rwandese] has always been my dream, to
sit in a country where I’m still aware of
who I am but at least I know it doesn’t
come with consequences. So, being a Tutsi,
if I go somewhere and someone say, ‘are
you Hutu or are you Tutsi,’ I can say ‘it
doesn’t matter!’”62
Informant VII spoke well on the
program: “I have always spoken about [Ndi
Umunyarwanda] because that is the
attempt, we are creating to evaluate the past
and see the wrongs and the evils of
ethnicity and replace them with Ndi
Umunyarwanda.”63 Informant III believes
the Ndi Umunyarwanda teachings are to
put favoritism and discrimination in
Rwanda’s past. Academic Informant III
saw the older generation with an attachment

59

61

Informant III, interview by author. Butare,
Rwanda. April 25, 2017.
60
Informant VII, interview by author. Kigali,
Rwanda. April 27, 2017.
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Informant III, interview.
Informant VII, interview.
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Informant VII, interview.
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to ubwoko that is difficult to fight against,
but the program is being accepted by the
younger generation.
Informant III and VII believed
ubwoko ideology is not dead and will not
die for a few generations. Claims stating
unification of all Rwandans are false in the
eyes of Tutsi survivors but through
programs like Ndi Umunyarwanda,
Rwandans are fighting this ideology.
Ubwoko should be downplayed but cannot
die, because as Informant VII pointed out,
the name of the genocide keeps Abatutsi,
Abahutu and Abatwa alive.

Hutu Perpetrator: Informant IV and VI
identified as Hutu perpetrators. Both informants
were agriculturalists over the age of 50.
Informant IV was a female and Informant VI
was a male. They both participated in TIG
(Travail d’Intérêt Général, French; “works of
general service”), a reconstructive alternative to
prison that focused on unlearning hate and
rebuilding the communities destroyed during
genocide. The interviews were translated from
Kinyarwanda.
Both informants clung to their Hutu
identity in the past, but each felt it was
“impossible” to find Abahutu, Abatutsi and
Abatwa in Rwanda today; everyone in Rwanda
are Rwandese. It was evident that the
reeducation within TIG created this shift in
ubwoko ideology: “Today, a Tutsi is a friend to
[a Hutu] – he can go and share everything with
him…There are no differences…Everyone
today is in the same line – they are Rwandese.
They are walking together in daily life…We
don’t feel anything now, we are free from these
labels,” said Informant VI.64 Informant VI saw
TIG as a calling for forgiveness across Rwanda.
In TIG, Informant IV learned that, “We have to
64

Informant VI, interview by author, translated
by Margot Manuella. Kigali, Rwanda. April 27,
2017.
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avoid [bad ideology] and they teach us how to
create friendships between everyone. And to
make sure to talk to people with that bad
[ideology]. Our country has been living on a bad
past, but we are all the same… we need to make
sure everyone is Ndi Umunyarwanda—no Hutu,
no Tutsi, no anything else.”65
The two Hutu perpetrators believed the
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was good and so
was the governance promoting it.
Hutu Bystander: Informant IX was the only
Hutu bystander interviewed. His experience was
unique because he was involved in the creation
of the Ndi Umunyarwanda program in 2014. He
was 30-50 years old, a male and a member of
the Rwandan Parliament. He identified as Hutu
before genocide because that is what his parents
told him he was but gave no explanation.
Today, he identified as Rwandan and fights the
ubwoko ideology:
My kids will know that my wife is a
Tutsi by background and I am a Hutu
by background and they will know
what it meant in the past…they will
know that the foundation of our
marriage was on Rwandanism…
They were born because we broke this
bridge [between Hutu and Tutsi]…
So, these kids will not be Hutu, they
will not be Tutsi, they will be real
Rwandans: that is what I breed.66
Informant IX’s intention of the program was to
take the blame off young people for what their
previous generation had done. The program was
meant to create a platform to move on together
with one identity. He elaborated:
The younger generation will not
understand that they have a
65

Informant VI, interview.
Informant IX. Interview by author. Personal
interview. Kigali, May 3, 2017.
66
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responsibility of rebuilding this nation
when they are not together. If they are
pointing fingers to some young people
saying, “your parents destroyed the
company, come rebuild it,” “your
parents killed us, now come rebuild
[the country].” No… They have to
fight for the good for this country
together.67

them, but he believed the Rwandan identity was
always beneficial.
The benefits from one using amoko in the
public sphere is what the government tried to
prevent through this program. As explained by
Informant X:
The government is saying, feel free to
belong to any group that you want. Feel
free to say that you are a Hutu, a Tutsi, or
you are a Twa, but you should not, you
should not use those for any political ends
or economic [means]… I would obviously
say that I am a Tutsi, but I don’t think that
means much to me in Rwanda today.
Because I have no advantages or benefits
that accrue from the fact that I am a
Tutsi.68

Informant IX emphasized that Rwanda was in a
transitional period and Ndi Umunyarwanda aided
in the transition. According to him, the only
negative aspect was that more people were not
adopting the ideology. The genocide happened
because of the negative ideology, and Informant
IX did his part to make sure it does not reoccur.
Tutsi Refugee: Informants V, X and XI identified
as Tutsi refugees. Each spent time in Uganda but
Informant XI lived in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo and the United Kingdom before
returning to Rwanda as an advisor to President
Kagame in 2002. Informant V and X both worked
in the civil society promoting peace and
reconciliation. All three informants were men and
Informant V was 18-30 years old; Informant X
was 30-50 years old; and Informant XI was over
50 years of age.
Although outside of Rwanda, the three
informants identified as Rwandans they
nonetheless subscribed to the concept ubwoko. In
Uganda, their ubwoko was not as important as
where they came from, Rwanda. The Tutsi
refugees found strength in the Ndi Umunyarwanda
program because it aligned with how they had
identified their entire lives. They felt they were
better off identifying as Rwandan and felt that
others will gain from it parting with their amoko as
well.
Informant X believed individuals only
used ubwoko identities when it was beneficial for

Informant X believes the program “is the
right way to go” and all criticism on the program is
a “baseless” form of genocide ideology. He
continued: “Really to me, being a Hutu or a Tutsi
or a Twa, it doesn’t bring the bread on the table.
But being a Rwandan helps you to understand
your level of one, patriotism, love, compassion, all
of those strong values, human values that are
needed for a day-to-day life.”69
The Tutsi refugees were optimistic
regarding the program. Informant V said it best:
“My optimism is that a time will come when the
right will overcome the wrong. We are all
Rwandese, not by mistake or pressure but by
origin… This ethnicity is what brings people
together. This is what makes people one.”70
Hutu Resuer: Informant I was a Hutu rescuer. He
claimed that the identification of Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa were never the problem, instead it was how
amoko were politically manipulated by the
colonialists. He identified as Rwandan but sees
segregated social groups:

67

69

68

70

Informant IX, interview.
Informant X, interview by author. Kigali,
Rwanda. May 3, 2017.
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Informant X, interview.
Informant V, interview by author, Kigali,
Rwanda, April 26, 2017.
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Up to today, we haven’t managed to
fight against ethnicity in the sense that
when it comes to things like wedding
invitations…the wedding of the Twa is
99% Twa. And it is the same for the
Hutu, the wedding of the Tutsis, still the
same. Politically, everyone will go to
school and have all these rights. But still
there is still this idea of associating and
inviting and knowing each other.71
Before genocide, Informant I knew his
family categorized as Hutu. “The way I was
brought up, I was above [identifying by
ubwoko]. I associated with the Hutus and the
Tutsis without feeling proud of being a Hutu or
undermining the Tutsis.”72Today, his identity is
Rwandan but struggles with his post-genocide
category as he is ostracized as a traitor by
Abahutu and distrusted by survivors.
Regarding the Ndi Umunyarwanda
program, Informant I stated: “I believe this Ndi
Umunyarwanda is beneficial, especially to the
young. Had it been taught before genocide and the
government focused on teaching on Rwandaness
then the genocide would not have been there.” He
firmly believes, however, the directives for the
program come from the bottom, down and “[The
government] injects the spirit of being Rwandan
into the community.”73
Informant I saw ubwoko as a spreading
virus that must be stopped.

identities. It may be for people who still have
genocide ideology, they may teach their children.
But properly, there is not.”74
Informant II believed Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
were all Rwandan based on culture, language and
geographical location. He did, however, claim that
he saw a generational difference between those
who held ubwoko ideology. Informant II identified
with the Ndi Umunyarwanda program for many
reasons, but especially that it was a place to learn
from those directing the conversation: “If someone
has a misunderstanding you have the chance to
give him the proper understanding [with Ndi
Umunyarwanda] and get him to the right speed.”75
He suggested expansion of the program to
communities, beyond academia.
“[The conversation on ethnicity] can’t ever
be bad. It is always good.”76
Unknown: Informant VIII did not associate with
ubwoko or post-genocide identities during the
interview. He was the chief executive officer of the
Rwandan Governance Board, in the 30–50 age
category and identified as Rwandan. He was
previously a professor who taught political
science.
Informant VIII was aware of negating criticism but
responded differently than other informants. He
said:
Negating ethnicity is a good thing…When
you look at it from outside, sometimes you
don’t feel the pain that people have
experienced being prisoners of those
identities…we have been prisoners of
Hutu, Tutsi identities, I don’t think we
have got anything good out of it… the only
thing we have gotten is just genocide? So,

Unborn Rwandan: Informant II, a university
student born after the genocide, did not identify
with ubwoko categories. He stated there is no need
for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and it was not
used: “No, there is no way that anyone can be
referred to by the school or the church by the
71

Informant I, interview by author, translated by
Bernard Rutikanda. Butare, Rwanda. April 25,
2017.
72
Informant I, interview.
73
Informant I, interview.
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Informant II, interview by author. Butare,
Rwanda. April 25, 2017.
75
Informant II, interview.
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Informant II, interview.
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deterring it for me is not a bad thing…we
survived [those identities].77
To informant VIII, Ndi Umunyarwanda
represented similarities in Rwandan culture and
the aspiration for all Rwandans to be united. He
believed in the power of the program. He only
spoke of his professional experience with the
program.
Further Analysis: Ultimately, informants in all
intersections identified as Rwandan and that
ubwoko has no value in the modern context. Hutu
perpetrators, unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders
and the unknown informant claimed that Abahutu,
Abatusi and Abatwa do not exist in Rwanda today,
directly conflicting with the views held by Tutsi
survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers.
Similarly, all Rwandans interviewed believed the
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was effective, but
the same split occurred when asked the downfalls
of the program. The Hutu perpetrators, unborn
Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the unknown
informant saw no flaws in the program. The Tutsi
survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers
critiqued its implementation.
In both instances, Hutu perpetrators,
unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the
unknown informant all favored Rwandan
government ideologies. The Tutsi survivors, Tutsi
refugees and Hutu rescuers spoke freely of their
experiences and observations. The observation
creates two categories, splitting the Abahutu. The
once unified and shared-experienced Abahutu
have diachronically split, part staying together and
the other part presently moving toward the
Abatutsi experience. Ubwoko experience shifted,
putting more emphasis on the mutually inclusive
ubwoko/post-genocide intersect, creating mistrust,

77

Informant VIII, interview by author. Kigali,
Rwanda. May 3, 2017.
78
Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and
Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide
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blame and stagnation and a newly maintained
group boundary.78
The second group (Hutu perpetrators,
unborn Rwandans and Hutu bystanders) fall into a
more vulnerable subsection of society—Hutu
perpetrators feel they must repay society for their
actions, Hutu bystanders the same but for not
stopping genocide, unborn Rwandans are young
and malleable—and shared similar ideologies.
Through knowledge of historical cultural
expectations of obedience and social conditioning
of authoritative acceptance, it was perceived that
these groups were did not critically dissected
government ideologies before accepting them,
including the Ndi Umunyarwanda program. The
reason for this is unknown based off of the data.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The rhetoric of the program was
emphasized to perpetrators and Rwandans born
after the genocide. The informants who expressed
Ndi Umunyarwanda teachings most verbatim were
Informants II, IV and VI: those falling in the
unborn Rwandan and Abahutu perpetrator
categories. Although most skepticism came from
Informant I, all eleven informants agreed Ndi
Umunyarwanda ideology was a strong form of
reconciliation.
In conclusion, individuals live through
their Rwandan and mutually inclusive postgenocide and ubwoko identities differently. This
has resulted in varying experiences and reactions
to the Ndi Umunyarwanda program. Some
believed the program to be perfect, curated by the
people for the people. Others felt the ideology was
a directive from the top down and injected into the
population.
The findings emphasized the mutually
inclusive experiences of ubwoko and postgenocide identities while uncovering a shift of
in Rwanda." Peace Review 15, no., 3 (2003):
287-94.
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shared experiences and a dissolving group
boundary around those who historically identified
as Hutu. This could all be strengthened by a larger
and more well-rounded sample of informants. My
recommendation would be to follow this study
with a greater volume of interviews that includes
more women, Twa representation and a more
robust span of ages and geographical residences.
The Ndi Umunyarwanda program was
seen as essential reconciliation process to political
leaders. However, these leaders did not consider or
cater to all intersections and experiences of
Rwandans before implementation. The top-down,
authoritative approach intimidates Rwanda’s
democracy instead of allowing for grass roots
participation of citizens to create the conversation
and come to a deeper understanding amongst
themselves. This deeper understand could have the
potential for deeply rooted and authentic
peacefulness. If the program made changes to
increase participation, it has the potential to serve
all Rwandans equally “in such a way that people
can be free to ‘live out’ their ethnic identity” in any
way they choose.79
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Appendix A: Demographic of Informants

1

Age

Sex

Occupation

Category

Intersection

Date of Interview

I1

50+

Male

Agriculture

Personal

Hutu//Rescuer

25 April 2017

II

18-30

Male

Student

Personal

2

25 April 2017

III

50+

Male

Professor

Academia

Tutsi//Refugee

25 April 2017

IV1

50+

Female

Agriculture

Personal

Hutu//Perpetrator

26 April 2017

V

18-30

Male

Civil Society

Personal

Tutsi//Refugee

26 April 2017

VI1

50+

Male

Agriculture

Personal

Hutu//Perpetrator

27 April 2017

VII

50+

Male

Pastor of Anglican Church

Personal

Tutsi//Survivor

27 April 2017

VIII

30-50

Male

CEO of RGB

Political

3

2 May 2017

IX

30-50

Male

Member of Parliament

Political

Hutu//Bystander

3 May 2017

X

30-50

Male

Civil Society

Personal

Tutsi//Refugee

3 May 2017

XI

50+

Male

Presidential Advisor

Political

Tutsi//Refugee

9 May 2017

2

Interview translated to English from Kinyarwanda. This informant did not
state his ethnic background and he was born
post-genocide. 3This informant did not state his ethnic background or his status
during genocide.

Appendix B: Example Interview Questions
Beginning each interview was a summary of the study with research intensions and researcher information. After age,
occupation, and informant-identified background information was asked for.
1. Understand the definition of ethnicity from the perspective of individual Rwandans.
a. Growing up, were you aware of ethnicity? Was it taught in school?
b. What does ethnicity mean to you? Could you define it?
c. Do you think your experience from 1959 through 1994 has shaped this idea of ethnicity? If so, how?
d. What about your experience post-1994? If so, how?
2. Explore the shifts in the meaning of ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ over time.
a. What do you think it means to identify by ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa?’
3. Analyze the political and cultural implications these identities had (or have now) in the lives of Rwandans.
a. What do you think being ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ means to the government?
b. What do you think it means in everyday life?
c. Do ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ associated themselves in the same social circles?
d. How do you feel the idea of identifying as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have shifted in your lifetime?
4. Explore the strength behind modern identifications as ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ or Rwandan and how this fits in with society.
a. Are there still practices or traditions that are identified with these ethnic identities?
b. How strongly did you identify as ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ before the conflict began?
c. How strongly do you identify with your ethnicity now?
5. Identify positive and negative consequences and intentions of the Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme as it is used in the
context of ethnicity in Rwanda.
a. How do you feel the conversation on ethnicity is today in Rwanda?
b. What are the positive and negative aspects of this dialogue?
c. Do you feel the Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme has had positive consequences?
d. Do you feel this program is negating ethnicity in any ways?
e. Have you heard the critique that Rwanda is negating ethnicity What is your response?

47

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020

47

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

How a Tweet
Brought People to
the Street: Social
Media and the
Success of Ni Una
Menos
KAYLA FRAIN
“Ni Una Menos is part of that revolutionary
lineage of feminist’s politics in Argentina. We
are the daughters of their disobedience. We are
the locas, or crazy women, as the Madres [de
Plaza de Mayo] were called. We are the heirs of
the desaparecidas [disappeared] and the
feminist organizations that came before us. We
translate this powerful heritage into a political
language trained in queer poetry and literature, a
movement that I like to call las lenguas de las
locas, [the language of the insane], amplified by
a critical use of the tools of communications
technology.” - Cecilia Palmeiro, member of Ni
Una Menos since 2015
Abstract
Femicide is a problem all over the globe,
taking one women every six hours. In
Argentina, the Ni Una Menos movement was
formed with the main goal of decreasing the
number of femicides happening in Argentina
each year. The Ni Una Menos movement draws
from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st
century mass media to galvanize the public
towards effective social and political change.
Literature Review

48

When Chiara Paez was 14 years old and a few
weeks pregnant, she was beaten to death by her boyfriend
and his mother. Her body was found after a three day
search in the garden of her boyfriend's house. A few
months prior, Daiana Garcia, 19 years old, was found on
the side of the road. All of her remains were inside a
garbage bag. Maria Eugenia Lanzetti, 44-year-old
schoolteacher was killed in front of her students by her
husband when he cut her throat. Andrea Tacumán was
shot dead by her boyfriend. Fiorella Aghem was
murdered in the Misiones provinces by her boyfriend. Her
body was found in the middle of a yerba plantation.
Vanina Cattáneo was set on fire by her partner, suffering
from burns on 50 percent of her body. She died a few
days later. Angeles Rawson was 16 when she disappeared
on the way home from gym class. Her body was found by
a worker at a garbage processing plant outside of Buenos
Aires. Behind every femicide there is a story just like one
of these. These are just a few examples of the gender
violence that is happening every single day in Argentina.
The violent killings of women are not new, but

within the last six years they have become more
prominent in the Argentina’s news reports. The
statistics are startling about gender violence in
Argentina; a woman dies every 30 hours due to
gender based violence; one child is left without
a mother every 26 hours. These crimes are
called “femicides”. Femicides are the killing of
women because of their gender. These crimes
against women can take many forms. They are
committed in both public and private places,
during the night or in broad daylight, and
sometimes there is even a bystander. Femicide
can be seen as both a political and a public
health problem and it needs to be addressed.
Argentina is a country where the gender
norms are extremely prevalent. These women
are expected to fulfill a role inside of the house
where they take care of both the children and
household (Marini 1977). After the economic
crisis in 2001-2002 there was hope that the
government would begin to help change these
gender norms as most families were sinking into
poverty. Instead with ‘Plan Familias’ and
‘Universal child allowance’ the government
inadvertently discouraged women from seeking
non-motherhood paid employment and
reinforced traditional gender roles (Lopreite
2015). 98 percent of the direct recipients of the
allowance were mothers in the universal child
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allowance program (Lopreite 2015). The
traditional roles of motherhood are something
that Argentina is proud of and believes is the
best for the country (Marini 1977).
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were
some of the first women to push the limits as to
what it means to be a mother. The Mothers
stepped outside of the house and made their
voices heard. They were standing up for their
children and elevating women's agency by
speaking out. During the Guerra Sucia (Dirty
War) in Argentina, 30,000 people were taken by
the dictatorship for speaking out against the
government (Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the
missing children, the mothers took to the street
to look for their children. The children who
disappeared were of all ages. Many were in their
teens, early 20s and 30s, most of which had
strong feelings against the dictatorship (Luengo
2018). The dictatorship wanted to “purge from
society the idea of subversion along with the
ideologies and political traditions that junta
leaders connected with” (Lewis 2001). The
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were some of the
first people in Argentina to fight for human
rights and to acknowledge that what the
dictatorship did was not legal (Luengo 2018).
The Mothers paved the way for a human rights
discussions, demonstrated how to grow
awareness and demand justice.
Néston Kirchner came into power in 2003 and
made a change to focus more on global human
rights (Muengo 2018). With the large emphasis
on human rights, some women begin to make
the argument that women’s rights are human
rights (Borland, 2007, Lopreite, 2012). With the
improved definition of human rights the context
was set up for the creation of the Ni Una
Menos80 movement. Social media plays an
important role in how people communicate with
each other and how information can be spread
(Youmans 2012, Kidd 2016). The Ni Una
Menos movement uses social media to grow

awareness, strategize and promote their cause.
The Ni Una Menos movement began with a
tweet from Ojeda after hearing about another
femicide (Fuentes 2019). Feminists, activists,
women and men throughout all of Argentina
decided that they had had enough and began to
demand the end to femicide. The use of the
hashtag, #niunamenos, is an essential part of the
movement and has allowed people to identify
the Ni Una Menos movement and join the cause
(Luengo 2018).
The Ni Una Menos movement draws
from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st
century mass media to galvanize the public
towards effective social and political change.
This paper will discuss the social movement
methods that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
used and the methods that the Ni Una Menos
movement is currently using. The resource
mobilization theory will be used to evaluate the
success of the two movements. The resource
mobilization theory is based on the idea that
there must be available resources that can be
mobilized in order for successful social
movements to occur (McCarthy and Zald 1977)
Twitter and Facebook will be the main mass
media platforms that will be analyzed
throughout, as these platforms are the most
popular vehicles used by the Ni Una Menos
movement. At the time of the Ni Una Menos
movement, many people saw the role of women
to be inside of the house and taking care of
children. As Argentina has progressed more and
more women are living professional lives and
choosing not to marry or conform to the
traditional norms. The Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo movement were obeying these gendered
norms, as they were doing what any mother
would do, look for their missing children. The
Ni Una Menos is something that Argentina has
never seen before. The role of social media
allowed the Ni Una Menos movement to gain

80
Not One Less. Movement that started in Argentina
in 2015. Not one less woman dies of femicide in
Argentina.

49

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020

49

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

real traction, pushing this movement forward to
make both social and political change
Femicide
According to the World Health
Organization, “Femicide is generally understood
to involve intentional murder of women because
they are women, but broader definitions include
any killings of women or girls” (World Health
Organization 2014). Femicide is often
committed by a man, and sometimes female
family members can assist in the killings.
Femicide differs from homicide because the
cases of femicide are perpetrated by partners,
ex-partners, male family members, and usually
involve ongoing abuse in the home, sexual
violence, threats, and intimindations. These are
situations where the woman has significantly
less power than the man.
Femicide is very prevalent around the
world but especially in Latin America. Out of
the top 25 countries with the highest rates of
femicide around the world, 14 of them are in the
Latin America and Caribbean region.
Figure 1 demonstrates the prevalence of
femicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In
2018, Brazil had the most femicides with 1,206
deaths. This is such a significant number of
women to be killed by their male partner.
Argentina had 255 femicides in 2018. 255 is
still a strikingly high number and is significant
since this is way too many women to be dying
due to femicide.

Figure 1: United Nations Economic

81

50

Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean. 2018.
As indicated by the figure above,
femicide is not just a problem in Argentina, it is
spread throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean.
It can be argued that the start of the Ni
Una Menos movement began in 2012. On April
18, 2012 Argentina’s Cámara de Diputados81
approved a bill that amends the Criminal Code,
“Law No. 11.179 of 1984, art. 80 to include
femicide as an aggravated type of homocide”
(Rodriguez-Ferrand, 2012).
“The new provision includes the
sanction of life imprisonment for an
individual who kills his ascendant or
descendant relative, spouse or former
spouse, or a person with whom he has or
has had an intimate relationship, even if
they were not living together at the time
of the crime. Femicide is defined as a
crime of murder perpetrated by a man
against a woman in the context of gender
violence” (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012).
The new amendment gives a definition
to femicide, which was very much needed in
Argentina. The levels of gender based violence
had only been growing leading up to the
amendment, so this was a much anticipated
change that had to be made (Rodriguez-Ferrand
2012). In the year leading up to the amendment
of the Criminal Code, there had been an
increase rate of femicides in the country by 20
percent (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012). Before the
Criminal Code had been amended the murder
would have just been considered a homicide. In
addition to declaring femicide an aggravated
form of homicide, the law denounces the killing
of women as a crime of passion. Men could no
longer claim that the killing of the wife or the
girlfriend was a crime of passion or love
(Piscopo 2016). They were committing murder
and now that State of Argentina said they would

The lower house of Argentina’s Congress
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recognize that, which seemed like a large
victory for many.
When the State of Argentina changed
the law because of the increasing numbers of
femicide, it gave the Ni Una Menos movement
legitimacy. Many people were ambitious that
this law would start to make a difference. By
including femicide in the law, hope was given to
the people of Argentina that the government
would start paying more attention to all of the
femicides occurring around the country. There
was an aspiration that funding would be
allocated to do more research, or even start to
provide resources to people who were suffering
in violent relationships. This law was only the
beginning of femicide becoming more
recognized across the country. It is often the
case that in Latin America and other countries,
where police, public prosecutors and judges in
Argentina fail to take violence against women
and girls seriously (Piscopo 2016). This
amendment to the Criminal Code provided hope
for activists, women, and many around the
country.
Taking a closer look at Argentina we can
see that over the last 10 years the number of
femicides have remained high. Every year the
total number of femicides is above 200 but stays
slightly below 300 femicides. Over the last few
years the trend has been over 250 femicides
each year.

Figure 2: La Casa Del Encuentro 2018.
Looking closely at the graph, one can notice that
in 2012 to 2013 the number of femicides
actually increased. As noted earlier, 2012 is the
year that in Argentina the bill was passed that
amended the Criminal Code. Now that

51

femicides have been acknowledged by the law
of Argentina for the first time, one could argue
that it gave women and families the confidence
that they needed to denounce gender-based
violence occurring in their homes and within
their friends and family. This is why there is
such a large jump in the number of femicides
that have been reported from 2012 to 2013.
In Argentina, a woman dies every 30
hours due to gender violence (Chenou and
Cepeda-Masemala 2019). A femicide can be
defined as “killing women because of their
gender” (Luengo 2018). Femicides are the cause
of machismo which means strong masculine
pride. Men feel as though they need to assert
their dominance, so they kill their wife or
girlfriend to prove their machismo. The Ni Una
Menos movement describes femicide as, “as an
action carried out by a person in order to punish
and psychically destroy a woman considered to
be someone’s property and they see this as an
act of mass murder of humanity in the body of a
woman” (Abrego 2017). There are two different
forms of femicide. There can be intimate
femicides, where women are dying inside of
their home and public/warlike femicides, when
women are dying in public places with
bystanders (Segato 2016). Segato proposes that
“there have never been more protective laws for
women’s rights, training sessions for security
forces, more published literature in circulation
about women’s rights, more prizes and
recognitions for accomplishments in the field of
women’s rights, and yet we women continue
dying” (Segato 2016). One of the biggest issues
for Argentina is that no one is enforcing the
laws. As Segato mentioned, the legal protection
for women exists in Argentina, the problem is
implementation. In 1931, Argentina was the
first country to pass a statutory quota law which
required at least 30 percent of political parties’
nominees for the national legislature to be
women (Piscopo 2016). Similarly, in 2003, a
trade union passed a quota law which required
women to hold 30 percent of seats on labor
unions’ directorates (Piscopo 2016). In 2002,
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there was a law passed mandating free
contraception and in 2006 a comprehensive
sexual education in public schools was required.
Yet contraception and sexual education is still
underprovided in many rural areas throughout
Argentina (Piscopo 2016). There is a need to
draw attention to the fact that Argentina’s
government is not implementing the laws. It
seems that there is a large disconnect.
Discrimination is widespread throughout the
country and there is limited political will and
public pressure to systematically tackle gender
descrimination. The community of Argentina as
a whole needs to focus on these femicides and
try to come up with a solution because the
current plan is not strong enough. Women need
to stop dying because they are a woman. When
discussing femicides, Rita Segato states,
“the warlike attitude toward women's
bodies in patriarchy and in its collective
representations used to have the
character of the Conquest of a territory
and its annexation including possession
through individual and collective rape or
through slavery for sexual services”
(Abrego 2017).
In a patriarchal country that has thickly rooted
cultural norms of machismo, it takes time to
break through these walls. With the use of social
media the Ni Una Menos movement has been
able to gain global attention and make a call to
action for women, citizens and politicians, that
would not have been made possible without the
aid of social media.
Traditional Gender Roles
Argentina is a country where the gender
norms are very prevalent in the society. It is
expected that the women stay home, cook, clean
and most importantly take care of the children.
“The praise of the family as the foundation of
society and of parental roles as the most
important vehicle for the transmission of and
control upon the observance of Christian and
patriotic virtues” (Marini 1977). The image of
women as the caregivers fulfills the Christian
and political viewpoint that the place for the
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women is inside of the house. It is also stressed
in the media that it is not the intention to
confine women to the household but if they
choose to venture outside, their household
duties must always come first (Marini 1977).
Women for the most part are seen inside
of the home. In figure 3, it demonstrates how
the majority of the jobs in the population are
filled by males. In 2019, over 60 percent of the
male population was employed and only 40
percent of the female population was employed.
The graph shows the trend of the two bars
coming closer together. This provides hope that
women are reaching some equality in the
workplace.

Figure 3: “World Development Indicators.”
2019
Women play an essential role in the
Argentine society and the government does their
best to reinforce these roles through specific
policies. After the economic crisis in 2001 2002 the government created a program called
“Plan Familias” (Lopreite 2015). The intention
of this program was to pay cash transfers to
poor women who were working as a mother
(Lopreite 2015). Yes, this program
acknowledged motherhood as a job, but it
reinforced the traditional gender roles of women
as mothers. Furthermore, it discouraged women
from seeking non-motherhood paid
employment. The government also created
“Universal child allowance” (Lopreite 2015).
This piece of legislation was intended to
encourage families to vaccinate their children
and send them to school (Lopreite 2015). When
this was done, the household would receive
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compensation. The program was designed to be
gender neutral but when it was put into action,
98 percent of the recipients were mothers
(Lopreite 2015). The goal of this program was
to help reduce poverty and this part was
successful. The unintended consequence was
the reinforcement of traditional gender roles.
These two programs have now stopped due to
government funding, but when they were both
in full force, these programs were contributing
to the long established gender roles in
Argentina.
Guerra Sucia
The Guerra Sucia82 began in 1975 and
lasted until 1983 (Scharpf, Balcells, & Sullivan,
2018). During this time “a campaign of state
terrorism against real and suspected enemies of
the state, leads to the death and disappearance of
tens of thousands of Argentines and foreign
nationals” (Lewis 2001). The goals of the
dictatorship was to “purge from society the idea
of subversion along with the ideologies and
political traditions that junta leaders connected
with” (Lewis, 2001). Most of the victims were
young, in their teens to 30s. “This self-terrorism
claimed around 30,000 disappearances of
mostly students, according to their families.
Whatever happened to all these people is still
kept secret, but stories of torture, killings and
burials at sea surfaced from the few witnesses”
(Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the missing
children in Argentina, the Mothers took to the
streets to demand answers about those who had
disappeared. Since the first time that the
Mothers challenged the dictatorship, they have
been making waves across Argentina. The
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo serve as an
inspiration for the Ni Una Menos movement
because they paved the way for human rights
discussions, demonstrated how to build and
grow awareness and demand justice from the
government. The Mothers now serve as a
symbol of resistance for the Ni Una Menos
movement.
82
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Resource Mobilization Theory
The resource mobilization theory is
based on the idea that there must be available
resources that can be mobilized in order for
successful social movements to occur
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). “Resource
mobilization theory views social movements as
normal, rational, institutionally rootes, political
challenges by aggrieved groups” (Beneford
2000). The resource mobilization theory states
that most social movements are based on
grievances. There must be a support base,
constituents, individuals or organizations that
provide support. Social movement organizations
have a number of strategic tasks, “these tasks
include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing
and/or transforming mass and elite publics into
sympathizers, achieving change in targets”
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). The resource
mobilization theory also notes that there needs
to be a relation to larger society. Most
importantly the resource mobilization theory
requires the presence of a resource. The
resource mobilization theory is able to
determine if a social movement is successful or
not.
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
In 1977, the mothers of the disappeared children
mobilized to the streets to demand the truth about their
children. When these mothers took to the street, many
people were taken aback. The traditional gender roles in
Argentina imply that a woman should be in the
household. One viewpoint is that the Mothers were
fulfilling their traditional gender roles by making their
way to the street to inquire more information about their
children, as opposed to acting against these traditional
roles, for a mother in Argentina their babies are
everything. Mothers invest time, energy and money into
their children; as they are their livelihood. So when
someone takes your children, the response is simple and
quite obvious; you try to find your child, your everything.

The Mothers did what they did best, they were
looking out for their children. “Men tended to
be the main wage earner so they could not spend
everyday looking for their children. Women
have been socialized to be obedient and passive,
they could not simply refused to be okay with

The Dirty War
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the loss of their child” (Malin 1994). Women
were filling their traditional role of motherhood
by showing up to march. To the Mothers, the
movement was not seen as extreme or radical at
the time. In the moment it was quite simple, the
government had committed horrific human
rights violations by taking their children, and
they not only wanted, but needed answers. The
Mothers showed up to the plaza with nothing
more than their bodies and the intention of
finding out more about their children.
The Mothers were persistent about
finding the truth out about their children. They
gathered in front of the Casa Rosada, which is
the headquarters of the Argentine government in
Buenos Aires. When the mothers of the
disappeared first met they were just looking for
answers from the government. After being
turned down time and time again by officials,
they decided it was time for them to take
another approach. They began displaying the
names and photographs of their loved ones who
were part of the disappeared. The Mothers were
gaining a great deal of attention from the people
walking by. The plaza was a public place, so
many people found out about their grievances.
Soon after, the mothers decided to begin
marching on Thursdays in the plaza. On April
30th, 1977, 14 brave women took to the streets
to confront the brutal dictatorship and find
answers to who had stolen their children
(Femenía 1987). Four decades later and the
Mothers have continued marching every
Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon (Goñi 2017).
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have
completed 2,037 marches as of 2017 (Goñi
2017).
Resource Mobilization Theory and The Mothers
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
movement can be applied to the resource
mobilization theory to prove that it was a
successful movement. When looking at the
movement from a birds eye view it is easy to
think that the Mothers did not have many
83
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resources at their disposal. Even with the
limited resources the Mothers made sure to
mobilize them in an effective way. The Mothers
utilized the Plaza de Mayo, the white
handkerchief, and the role of Motherhood.
The Plaza de Mayo is an open public
space. At one end of the Plaza there is the Casa
Rosada83, which is the home to the President
(Bondera 2014). The Mothers originally started
congregating there because they wanted to get
the attention of government officials (Bondera
2014). As the government was actively ignoring
the angry Mothers, people who passed by would
ask questions and were curious about what was
going on in front of the Casa Rosada (Bondera
2014). The location of the Plaza de Mayo served
as a strong resource for the Mothers because
they were able to spread the word about their
movement and inform curious citizens about the
violations of human rights that the government
committed.
Another resource that the Mothers
ultized is their symbol of the white
handkerchief. The white handkerchief is also the
white diaper kerchiefs and is what is used to
recognize the Mothers. This is an unlikely
resource but one that was very successful with
this movement. The image of the white
handkerchief distributed throughout the
community also helped get the word out of the
movement. It also provided a constant reminder
about the violations that the dictatorship had
committed.
The final resource that the Mothers used
to their advantage is the traditional gender
norms. Like it has been mentioned before, the
traditional role of Motherhood is ingrained in
Argentine culture. Mothers are expected to take
care of their children and the household. When
their children disappeared, the Mothers see it as
their duty to find their children. The Mothers
utilize their traditional role of Motherhood to
expand this obligation and show other Mothers
that they can be doing more with their lives. The
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Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo mobilized their
role and were able to get hundreds of women to
march with them across Argentina to find
answers about their missing children.
Although not obvious upon first glance,
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement
can be applied to the resource mobilization
theory. The Mothers utilize three resources, the
Plaza, the white handkerchief, and the
traditional role of Motherhood. Resource
mobilization theory places a large emphasis on
resources and opportunity (Buechler 1993). To
evaluate how the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
utilize the resource mobilization theory, it will
be defined into three parts, support base,
strategy and tactics, and relation to larger
society (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo is a
social movement that is based upon grievances.
The Mothers are marching because they are
grieving their disappeared children who are
presumably dead. When the Mothers began their
marches they were not really supported by
anyone. This is not to say that people were
against what they were marching for but public
organizations did not immediately take notice.
The Mothers used a public and open area to
congregate so they did not need to have any
supporters provide that. The Mothers really did
not rely on any outside help from organizations.
They were just happy when people wanted to
join them in the search for their children.
The tactics used by the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo to mobilize supporters were the
role of Motherhood and word of mouth. The
Mothers movement emphasized that the role of
a mother was to look for their children, and it
was their duty to find out what happened to
them.. Mothers also utilized word of mouth. By
talking about the disappearances they were able
to spread awareness of where they were meeting
each week to get more citizens to join them.
The resource mobilization theory
highlights the resources that the Mothers
utilized to make their movement successful. The
Mothers took advantage of the public Plaza de
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Mayo and its location in front of the Casa Rosa,
the classic image and symbolism of the white
handkerchief and the expansion from the
traditional gender roles of a woman.
Counter Argument
It can be argued that the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo play an important role of the Ni
Una Menos movement. The Mothers serve as an
inspiration as they paved the way for women to
advocate for their rights. But this was not the
Mothers intention. By taking to the street every
Thursday at 3:30pm the it can be argued that the
Mothers were just fulfilling their role of
Motherhood and nothing more.
The role of women is essential to the
Argentine culture. It is expected that the women
of Argentina fulfill all their duties inside of the
household before they venture out. The daily
life in Argentina is gendered. So for women this
means that they are the primary caregivers for
children and of their household (Borland 2007).
With this knowledge it is quite clear to make the
connection with why women took to the streets.
During the Dirty War many kids were taken,
they had disappeared. Their mothers had no idea
where they were, so naturally they began to search
for their children. When a child is missing the expected
response of a mother is to look for her child. So it was not
surprising that the Mothers took to the streets because this
was fulfilling their role as a Mother. As women began to
protest, they were still expected to be taking care of the

household and children (Borland 2007). The
mothers of the disappeared were fulfilling their
role of motherhood when they took to the streets
to look for their children.
This argument is important. Yes, the
Mothers did fulfill their role of a women when
they began marching around the Plaza de Mayo.
But in doing this they did so much more. I am
arguing that the primary goal of the women
protesting was to empower other women and to
create a space where you can challenge the
status quo. The Mothers saw the wave of
protests as an opportunity to make demands for
gender equity and social justice.
The resource mobilization theory
provides us with a comprehensive way to
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analyze the success of a movement. When
applying the resource mobilization theory to the
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, it is clear that
they are successful. The Ni Una Menos
movement adopts some key elements from the
Mothers which further the Ni Una Menos
argument and cause. A large part of the success
that Ni Una Menos has had is due to the
Mothers, but another extremely important part
of the puzzle is social media. Social media is Ni
Una Menos resource and they utilize all aspects
of this tool. The Ni Una Menos movement
draws from the success of the Mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo while at the same time
integrating 21st century mass media to
galvanize the public towards effective social
and political change.
Resource Mobilization Theory
Social media is also the driving factor in
the success of the Ni Una Menos movement.
The resource mobilization theory model can be
applied to the Ni Una Menos movement to
analyze the success of the movement so far.
Resource mobilization emerged in the 1970s by
McCarthy and Zald as a way to study social
movements. According to the resource
mobilization perspective, “social movements are
an extension of politics by other means, and can
be analyzed in terms of conflicts of interest just
like other political struggle. Movements are also
seen as structured and patterned, so that they
can be analyzed in terms of organizational
dynamics just like other forms of institutional
action” (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resource
mobilization theory emphasizes resources and
opportunity (Buechler 1993). The resource
mobilization theory highlights the interaction
between resource availability, the preexisting
organization of preference structures and
entrepreneurs attempts to meet preference
demand (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The Ni Una
Menos movement utilizes social media as a
resource and incorporates it into already
existing organizations. Through applying the
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resource mobilization theory to the Ni Una
Menos movement it is clear that the success of
the movement is because of the utilization of
social media. To evaluate how Ni Una Menos
utilizes the resource mobilization theory, it will
be evaluated in three parts: support base,
strategy and tactics, and relation to larger
society.
Resource
In the 21st century social media was created,
which made news spread at an even faster rate. People are
able to access news and information at their fingertips.
For this paper, social media will be defined as a "group of
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological
and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that allow for
the creation and exchange of User Generated Content”
(Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Platforms such as Youtube,
Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Whatsapp and Facebook
are the most common in Argentina. As of 2018, the
leading social media platform in Argentina was Youtube,
where 93 percent of internet users utilize Youtube. Not
far behind was Facebook at 91 percent, Instagram at 68
percent and Twitter at 46 percent ("Leading social

media platforms in Argentina as of 3rd quarter
2018" 2019). When someone posts on these
platforms, they are creating user generated
content. User generated content can be
described as “various forms of media content
that are publicly available and created by end
users” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010).
For something to be considered user
generated content it must fulfill three basic
requirements. The first requirement is that it
must be published on a publicly accessible
website or on a social networking site. The
second says it needs to show creative effort, and
the third demands that it be created outside of
the professional setting (Kaplan and Haenlein
2010). These social networks have allowed for
the mobilization of social groups not just in
Argentina but around the world. Social media
allows people to connect even though they may
be millions of miles away, and because of this
social media can make the world feel smaller.
Social media can also be used to facilitate
events and ease the spread of information
because all you have to do is “share” or
“retweet” the news with a click of a button. It
allows people to reach a wider audience at a
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much faster pace. Social media is the driving
factor for the creation, mobilization and success
of the Ni Una Menos movement.
Many people are optimistic that social
media will be monumental in relation to social
movements. The term “techno-optimism” refers
to “those approaches that emphasize the
potential of social media technologies to solve
social problems” (Kidd 2016). While there are
some challenges with social media, technooptimists focus on the positive. Social
movements that utilize technology are not solely
on the internet, as it is important that they have
a balance of both communication via social
media and in person. Social movements like the
Ni Una Menos movement use social media to
organize, generate awareness and spread
information. “New social movements
spontaneously generate in moments of
indignation and spread virally, both online and
off” (Kidd 2016). By having both social media
and in person communication, social
movements are ensuring that everyone is
informed.
However, being too optimistic of social
media raises concerns. There are three major
flaws, “(i) it overstates the newness of social
media; (ii) it jumps to prediction without
evidence; and (iii) it underestimates the capacity
of existing hegemonies to adapt to technology”
(Kidd 2016). The Ni Una Menos movement has
done a good job with balancing the use of social
media and in person protests. It is great to have
faith in social media, but one must remember
that there are limitations to almost everything.
Support Base - Mothers
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
inspired the Ni Una Menos movement and set
the stage for the movement to take place. Both
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Ni
Una Menos movement are based upon
grievances towards the government. The
Mothers provide support to Ni Una Menos by
physically showing up to rallies and marches
and by providing inspiration in their fight.
Fighting for human rights, developing
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awareness and demanding justice are three areas
that the Mothers have provided support for Ni
Una Menos.
Human Rights
The Mothers believed that when the
dictatorship took their children that they were in
direct violation of human rights. The actions
taken by the dictatorship were wrong. No
human should be taken away from their family
and killed because of their beliefs. The Mothers
felt that “all human lives are valuable and
deserving of respect, regardless of the
individual’s particular ideological or political
affiliation” (Luengo 2018). The Mothers used
the human rights argument as they marched
each Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon in
Buenos Aires. It was not until Argentina
became a democracy in 1983 that the country
officially recognized human rights as something
that is legitimate and decided that as a country
they were going to pay more attention to the
human rights violations within their country
(Lopreite 2012). Many were energized by the
countries new commitment, “Argentina’s new
commitment to human rights provided a new
opportunity structure for women, and all
citizens” (Lopreite 2012) This new
governmental acknowledgement of human
rights allowed people to examine the atrocities
that happened during the Dirty War but also
provides hope for the future that there will be
limited violations. The commitment to human
rights also informed people of what their rights
were as humans allowing them to know and be
aware of the times when these rights were being
taken away from citizens. Under President
Néstor Kirchner, the term human rights began to
develop more traction in the country. Kirchner
established close links with many human rights
organizations, which included the Mothers and
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. This was a
very symbolic act by Krichner and was
continued on by his predecessor, Cristina
Krichner. The attention to human rights is the
immediate context for the immersion of the Ni
Una Menos movement.
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The Mothers marched in the street
because of the human rights violations that
occurred to their children. It can be argued that
the Mothers were the first group to advocate for
a human rights violations in the form of a social
movement. The Mothers determination to find
answers about their children inspired the Ni Una
Menos movement. The Ni Una Menos
movement echoes the fight of the Mothers for
human rights issues.
Developing Awareness
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo quickly
developed a routine after seeing just how many
women came to join the movement. The
movements began with just a few mothers
walking down to the house of the President to
try and discover more information. Everytime
the authorities refused to allow the women to
proceed any further. As time went on, this
gathering of Mothers grew exponentially. The
Mothers utilized word of mouth to spread
information. The Mothers also made themselves
known by protesting in a public place. Since
they were in the plaza, it is a very public place.
People who were walking by and curious about
the Mothers were about to spread awareness
about their fight and grow the movement that
way. In no time the movement had grown to
about 300 women. Once the movement got to a
significant size they became more structured.
The Mothers met every Thursday at 3:30 in the
afternoon, wearing a white head kerchief and
chanting “Bring them back alive” (Bondrea
2014). The Mothers did a lot to develop their
image and bring awareness to their cause.
The repetition of the movement is one of
the key factors that helped bring awareness to
the movement. The Mothers became a symbol
of reliability. The people in the community
knew that if they wanted to participate in a
march, the Mothers would be at the plaza every
Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon. The white
handkerchief also helped bring attention to the
cause. The white handkerchief allowed the
Mothers to be easily identified and quickly
became a symbol for the movement. Also by
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having the white handkerchief become the
symbol, this was able to be drawn, put on
posters and spread throughout the country. The
white handkerchief are one of the most
distinguishing features of the Mothers (Bondrea
2014). Whenever one sees a white handkerchief
on the sidewalk or in a poster, the immediate
association is the Mothers. The Ni Una Menos
also utilizes the handkerchief which ties them to
the Mothers. For the Mothers, the handkerchief
represents diapers and the purity of Motherhood
(Bouvard 2004).
The Ni Una Menos movement learned
from the Mothers how to bring awareness to
their movement. Even though the Ni Una
Menos movement occurs a few decades later the
strategies used by the Mothers are still relevant.
The Mothers utilized word of mouth. Mothers
would tell other moms about their plans and
then they would all meet up. With the use of
technology, the spread of information can be
wider. So for the Ni Una Menos movement
word of mouth is also used, but takes place on
social media. People are sharing with their
friends, inviting others and texting everyone that
they know about a gathering. The Mothers also
used the plaza to their advantage to bring
awareness to their cause. The plaza for the
Mothers is like social media to Ni Una Menos.
Social media is a public platform that Ni Una
Menos uses to spread their message. Another
tactic that made the Mother successful is their
consistency and reliability. The Mothers met
every Thursday at the same time in the same
place (Bondrea 2014). The Ni Una Menos
movement embodies this strategy by marching
every June 3rd. The protest on June 3rd is both
consistent and reliable. When the Ni Una Menos
took it upon themselves to also use a
handkerchief, they were using the symbol that
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo use. The
green handkerchief echoes the white one of the
Madres, “activists today are making the
connections to the women who have led
struggles and refused to give up on their vision
of social justice for decades” (Levy 2017). The
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handkerchief is a direct connection between the
two social movements and it is something that
will keep the group connected for decades to
come.
Demanding Justice
The Mothers also represent persistence
in their demand for justice. When the authorities
told the Mothers that they could not go any
further into the President's house, this did not
stop them. The Mothers were on a mission. The
determination of the Mothers is exhibited in the
spirit of the Ni Una Menos movement. The Ni
Una Menos movement demands justice for
victims of femicide and an end to femicide, but
they do not stop there. The movement also
demands equal pays and abortion rights for
women in Argentine. The inspiration to demand
for justice in the Ni Una Menos movement
comes from the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo.
Like the Mothers, the Ni Una Menos movement
is a symbol of resistance.
Support Base - Creation of the Ni Una Menos
Movement
An essential building block of the Ni
Una Menos movement was the reading
marathon that took place in March 2015. The
reading marathon aimed to raise awareness of
the killings of women in Argentina(Luengo
2018). The event was sparked after the murder
of nineteen-year-old Daiana García. The reading
marathon event was launched on social media
through a Facebook page that encouraged
activists, journalists, artists, writers and families
who had been affected by femicide to join “a
marathon of readings, projections and
performances against femicide” (Fuentes 2019).
The event was called “Ni Una Menos” by
Vanina Escales, as she wanted to give urgency
is the response needed for the daily murders of
women (Fuentes 2019, Chenou and Cepeda-

Másmela 2019). During the event, participants
exchanged stories, testimonials, and hopes for
the future of women and activists. The reading
marathon played a large role in the creation of
the Ni Una Menos movement as it was useful in
presenting the problem at hand: violence against
women. It also enlarged the audience by making
more people aware of the issue. This was
achieved by having the event be created on
social media, thus making easier for people to
invite their networks. Ni Una Menos also took
what they had learned from the Mothers about
building awareness at had the reading marathon
in a public place. They decided to host the event
in a central location, the national library of
Buenos Aires. Here, people were able to join the
reading marathon even if they had not heard of
the event prior.
On May 11th, 2015, radio journalist
Marcela Ojeda was outraged to hear about yet
another femicide in Argentina. Ojeda posted a
single tweet that sparked the global movement
Ni Una Menos, “Actrices, políticas, artistas,
empresarias, referentes sociales...mujeres, todas,
bah...no vamos a levantar la voz? NOS ESTAN
MATANDO”84. Ojeda’s tweet was in response
to the discovery of Chiara Paéz body, a fourteen
year old girl buried alive. The tweet triggered a
response of 252 likes and 197 retweets85
(Fuentes 2019). Ojeda’s tweet prompted the
street demonstrations across all of Argentina.
Marcela Ojeda was not the only one who took to
Twitter to voice her frustration. She was joined
by television journalist Florence Etcheves,
journalist Hinde Pomeraniec, director of
Barcelona Ingrid Beck, and television journalist
Valeria Sampedro. The group of women began
to organize a march that would bring awareness
to femicide and call for action. Even though
these women had not met each other before,
they were all united under the same cause.

84

Actresses, politicians, artists, business women,
social representatives … women, all of us, bah …
are we not going to raise our voices? THEY ARE
KILLING US.
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The tweet now has 250 retweets and 735 likes

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020

59

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

These women used social media to get
the word out about the first march. They created
a NiUnaMenos twitter account, which now has
69.6K followers so they could continue to
spread the news. The women asked friends and
family members to post pictures with the
hashtag #niunamenos just so they could get the
word out more. Through doing so, the women
were working to make the problem visible.
Less than a month after Ojeda’s tweet
the first march had been organized and took
place June 3, 2015. There were about 200,000
people in Buenos Aires and thousands of people
in cities all across Argentina that took place in
the march (Chenou and Cepeda-Mámela 2019).
Out of the 200,000 people who attended the
march in Buenos Aires, 61.2 percent of the
people marching found out about the march
through a form of social media.

Figure 4: De Angelis, Carlos. 2015.
This data emphasizes the point that
social media was so important in getting people
to the streets for the Ni Una Menos movement.
Social media allowed for the leaders of the
movement to get the word out fast, it took less
than one month for the whole march to come
together. As shown by the graph, over 60
percent of people out about the march through
social media. The other ways that people heard
about the march was through television and
through friends. Television was around 12
86

We put body, word, flags and posters to say that
macho violence kills and not only when the heart
stops beating. Because sexist violence also kills,
slowly, when it restricts freedoms, political and
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percent and friends was under 10 percent. It also
shows how powerful and widespread social
media is.
Every June 3rd, the Ni Una Menos
movement marches, “Ponemos cuerpo, palabra,
banderas y carteles para decir que la violencia
machista mata y no sólo cuando el corazón deja
de latir. Porque la violencia machista también
mata, lentamente, cuando coarta libertades,
participación política y social, la chance de
inventar otros mundos, otras comunidades, otros
vínculos”86 (niunamenos.org). By using the
#niunamenos as the slogan for the June 3rd
march, the hashtag was able to cross national
borders and inspire other movements in
neighboring countries.
Strategies and Tactics
The Ni Una Menos movement has been
able to use social media to come up with
strategies and tactics. Just one march gave the
movement lots of media attention. El País
stated, “Argentina is experiencing a time of
great political turmoil and division in the middle
of the electoral campaign. However, the
mobilization of #NotOneLess has been so great
that all candidates have backed this group’s
demands” and La Nación described, “the
demonstration managed to unite clashing flags
under one slogan: shouting down femicide and
changing a culture of violence. [It was] an
encounter where people from all social classes,
creeds, and ideologies visualized #NotOneLess”
(Luengo 2018). The movement gained national
attention and this could not have been done
without the help of Twitter to get the word out.
The creation of the Ni Una Menos movement
relied on Twitter to spread the word about the
movement, gain a greater audience, and get
people to the street to march throughout
Argentina.
The Ni Una Menos continues to utilize
social media as a way to keep people informed
social participation, the chance to invent other
worlds, other communities, other ties.
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and create a call to action. A year after the first
demonstration in June 2015, Ni Una Menos held
a second rally in June 2016 where they used the
hashtag #VivasNosQueremos87, which sites the
march against gender violence that was held in
Argentina (Fuentes 2019). On October 19, 2016
there was a sporadic march in which the leaders
of the Ni Una Menos organization used Twitter
to mobilize the public. On October 12, 2016
Lucia Pérez, was brutally murdered. The march
on October 19, was inspired by Lucia Pérez and
demanded an end to the violence of partiachy,
the right to legal, safe, and free abortions, and
for opening space for all our life
(niunamenos.org). For this march, the Ni Una
Menos movement used the hashtag
#NosotrasParamos88, and they also adopted the
hashtag #MiercolesNegro, taken the Polish
women who just had a strike against a planned
abortion ban and used the hashtag
#BlackMonday.
Social media is used to continue to
mobilize people towards short term and long
term solutions for femicide. One of the
campaigns that Ni Una Menos ran was the “De
la foto a la firm”89. In which the activists asked
celebrities and public officials to do more to
support the movement while they had been great
with posting selfies and pictures, the activists
wanted more. The organizers were asking the
celebrities and public officials to sign a
document in which they pledged to get
resources to end violence against women.
Through this campaign, the activists were able
to get the issue of gender violence on the
political agenda during a presidential election
year. This got politicians talking about gender
based violence throughout their political
campaigns and made people more aware of the
issue. This campaign utilized social media,
paired with a call to action encouraging people
in a position of power to do something more.

The hashtags are what mobilized the
people in the case of Argentina. A hashtag can
be considered “technopolitics” meaning, “the
centrality of uses of technology in the
organization, communication and performance
of collective action is contemporary social
movements” (Fuentes 2019). By creating a
hashtag of the slogan, it brought people
together, and made it easy for people to see
what Ni Una Menos as doing, as when you
looked up the movement you would see the
hashtag. The hashtag works “as anchors to
retrieve what has been said and done in
response to femicide or gender violence more
broadly, hashtag such as #NiUnaMenos enable
movements to expand their base, exploiting
dispersion, multiplicity and a-synchronicity”
(Fuentes 2019). The use of all of the different
hashtags allows the Ni Una Menos movement to
expand, making it more well known and
international while at the same time mobilizing
the masses within a short time period.
Relation to larger society
Since 2015 those involved in the Ni Una
Menos movement have fought to bring about a
lot of change in their society. The Ni Una
Menos movement has been extremely
successful in making people aware of femicide
in Argentina.
In 2016, President Mauricio Macri
created a national plan to fight violence against
women in Argentina (“National Action Plan for
the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of
Violence against Women.” 2016). This plan was
titled “The National Action Plan for the
Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of
Violence against Women” (“National Action
Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and
Eradication of Violence against Women.”
2016). The goals of this plan were to create a
network of women refuges, create a budget for
the electronic tagging of violent men, introduce

87

89

88

#WeWantOurselvesAlive
#WomenStrike
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gender violence in school curriculum, staff a
telephone helpline for women, and gain access
to microcredit to promote economic autonomy
for women (“Argentina Announces New Gender
Violence Plan.” 2016 and “National Action Plan
for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication
of Violence against Women.” 2016). These
were very ambitious goals for Argentina, but
much needed as the femicide rate was
continuing to increase.
It has been three years since the creation
of President Macri’s plan, and there has been
little improvement. If anything, Argentina has
seen an increase in femicide. In 2018, there
were 19 femicides in the month of January. In
January of this year, there were 30 femicides in
31 days. This was an increase of 11 femicides in
one month just a year apart. This has created
some major movement within the activist
communities in Argentina. Mujeres de la Matria
Latinoamericana (MuMaLá), a feminist activist
group, is calling for Argentina to declare a state
of emergency. The goal of declaring a state of
emergency to allow MuMaLá to get their budget
back for two years, so then they can make
breaking out of systemic violence a priority.
Later this year, the Commissioner for
International Cooperation and Development
granted eight million Euro to Argentina to
“boost efforts and strengthen institutions to
make sure that women and girls never have to
live in fear again” with the goal of achieving
true gender equality and living in a larger
society. This is great for Argentina, as they have
been granted funds to help combat the ever
growing issue of femicide. So far, the funds
have yet to be allocated to a specific resource.
The Ni Una Menos movement is still
very active in Argentina. There most recent
march was on November 25th, which was the
International Day for the Elimination of
Violence against Women (Santillana 2019). The
Ni Una Menos movement led this movement
with the message, “sexual violence is political
violence” (Santillana 2019). Since 2015, the Ni
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Una Menos movement has been fighting to
bring about equality to women.
In an interview with the New York
Times, cartoonist and writer Maitena
Burundarena states,“The solution has to come
from society, it won’t come from the state, not
all men are like that, we have to win over the
good ones, no right-thinking man can tolerate
violence against women. But someone has to
start teaching the ones who don’t understand it
that women are not the property of men” (Goñi
2015). The problem of femicide is so deeply
rooted in their society that a few changes to the
law might not make a difference. The Ni Una
Menos movement is trying to change how
society views and talks about femicide. Ni Una
Menos is trying to prevent femicide from ever
occurring again, and is doing this by trying to
change the perception in society in Argentina
that the killing of women is not okay.
Counter Argument
Social media can be dangerous for
social movements. This paper argues that
social media helps to galvanize people to
the streets for the Ni Una Menos
movement. But it is important to recognize
that social media does not always work.
Many people will argue that social media
actually has no effect on a social
movement. These people argue that
“social media is an impressive patina that
in actuality does little to fundamentally
transform the way that human beings
relate to each other in the real world”
(Kidd 2016). Social media creates a
barrier and it becomes hard for people to
relate in the world of the internet.
Malcolm Gladwell argues that people are
motivated by close relationships. This
would be high risk activism. People who
are deeply connected to each other will
make a greater difference for the cause.
Social media does not allow for close
relationships because they are all via the
internet. Social media also does not
encourage a lot of action. As seen in the

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol3/iss2/1

62

et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship Volume III Issue

Ni Una Menos movement, “Social media
encourages people to participate by
posting and liking, not by going into the
streets” (Kidd 2016). People do not mind
liking or sharing a message, but when they
actually have to do something, then people
are not that reliable.
Even though there can be an
argument made for how social media does
not play a role in social movements. In the
Ni Una Menos movement social media
played a large role and did inspire action.
Social media was the driving force behind
getting people to the streets to protest
gender based violence in Argentina. It can
be argued that the Ni Una Menos
movement would not exist without the
existence of Twitter.
Conclusion
The Ni Una Menos movement
draws from the success of the Mothers of
the Plaza de Mayo well at the same time
integrating 21st century mass media to
galvanize the public towards effective
social and political change. By applying
the resource mobilization theory to both
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the
Ni Una Menos movement it is clear that
they are both successful in gaining
awareness and demanding justice. Even
though the resources used by the groups
were different, the Mothers still managed
to inspire the Ni Una Menos movement.
There is still more research to be done in
this area. To further my research, I think it
would be useful for someone to expand on
what other countries who are facing a
similar issue of femicide are doing to
create change in their country, if they are
doing anything.
Gender-based violence is an
extremely important subject that needs to
be discussed. It is not just something that
happens in other countries, it is happening
right here in the United States. I think in
general more research needs to be done in
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this area, as it is something that people
tend to avoid because of the sensitive
nature of the topic. It is our duty as
researchers, academics and citizens to not
let gender based violence become an
epidemic.
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Multiculturalism as
a Way to Religious
Tolerance
Zahira Yusifova, Aydan Baghirli, Fatima
Fataliyeva, Elvin Valiyev, And Murad Malik
Aslanov
1. Introduction:
Religion in its core has existed side by side with
human beings for thousands of years, shifting its
shape and form along the way. Started by the
caveman societies using deities and supernatural
powers to explain basic characteristics of nature,
this kind of mindset provided comfort and
motivation for early humans to continue
discovering and researching their surroundings.
Gradually, beliefs in the supernatural became
more complex throughout the years, with deities
encompassing every single action and aspect of
life, with Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece
serving as prime examples of this shift. At this
point, with Abrahamic religions being the
predominant belief systems in the world, where
one deity is the source and cause of everything,
intolerance to other religions decreased steadily
up to modern times. This, however, does not
mean that discrimination and prejudice have
totally vanished from the societies. While the
Dark Ages with the Crusades and the Inquisitions
around the globe are long gone, people identified
by their religion and often belonging to a
religious minority groups in a specific country
face hardships and barriers in various parts of
their lives. Even in communities with selfproclaimed “progressive” views on the modern
world, this kind of persecution still runs rampant.
But in a world plagued with discrimination
toward religious minorities, are there any
90

Aykhan Kaya, “Multiculturalism and Minorities in
Turkey,” in Challenging Multiculturalism: European
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countries capable of setting an admirable
example to the rest? Those kinds of countries do
exist, and all of them follow a similar pattern.
Thus, the goal of this paper is to discuss
the existing cases of religious oppression around
the world emphasizing Azerbaijan as a role
model country to tackle religious intolerance and
presenting multiculturalism as the best way to
inculcate mutual respect and forbearance
between people. To do so, we will review a
number of relevant case studies underlining those
that target on minimization of religious
persecution, intolerance and disrespect. All in all,
this review paper gives count to the existing
problems around the globe followed up by the
representation of Azerbaijan’s multicultural
commitment as a role model in fostering peace
and love among people of various nations and
religions living in this country. The paper is
accompanied by the due references and
terminates with some concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review:
2.1. The Concept of Multiculturalism and
Religious Tolerance Globally
In contemporary society, as an aftermath
of globalization, the idea of multiculturalism is
widely practiced in many countries. According to
Kaya, nowadays, violence and racism are
excluded from the gentrification of society; as a
result, multiculturalism stands for an ability to
integrate cultures, minority groups, races, and
ethnicities within the borders of any country
without sacrificing the original identity 90 .
Multiculturalism in its prime was observed
during the centuries of the Ottoman Empire 91 .
Ottoman multiculturalism strongly intertwined
with the word “tolerance”, which, for instance, is
and continues to be a solid part of Turkish
history, starting from the early days of the
Ottoman Empire. That kind of multiculturalism
Models of Diversity 2013, ed. Raymond Taras (Edinburg:
Edinburg University Press, 2013), 313
91
Ibid., 299

Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020

67

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1

managed to positively affect economic, social
and political issues. However, multiculturalism
has its own share of opponents. West believes
that “multiculturalism is perceived as the greatest
safeguard against cultural conformity that leads
to racism, fascism, and totalitarianism.” 92 In
addition, thepropaganda of multiculturalism is
used by many international organizations
including European Union (EU). According to
Kaya, the perspective of EU was discussed
during a summit in December of 1999 and
completely changed the political viewpoints in
Turkey, opening up new religious perspectives
on social, ethnic and political rights 93 . For
instance, Kurds, Islamists, Armenians and a
number of religious and ethnic groups in Turkey
have become supporters of EU, seeing the EU as
the beacon of political stability and peace. In
addition to multiculturalism, tolerance is
something that we should strive and fight for94.
Tolerance is sometimes called a “Soft
Multiculturalism”, where minorities should not
face unfair discrimination and people of different
cultures and customs should be tolerated and
treated on a level playing field.
The modern progressive world, however,
did not manage to achieve the level of tolerance
needed to eliminate discrimination, with
numbers of countries speaking for themselves. In
this respect, Marshal provides examples of
China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria
where the cases of religious oppression, mainly,
violent attacks on religious minorities, have
considerably increased 95 . Although religious
majorities enjoy high levels of acceptability in
their respective regions, religious minorities still

suffer from persecution. According to the
biannual report presented by Australian Survey
of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), local Australians
were asked to specify their attitudes towards the
members of certain religious groups. In this
respect, Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses were
ranked as the least preferred ones96 . While the
Jehovah’s Witnesses were considered to be
“Australians with an undesirable religion”,
Muslims were treated simply as “undesirable
immigrants”, both grouped in the category
named “Keep out of Australia”. Due to Australia
being a predominantly Christian country, Greek
Orthodox, Anglican, and Presbyterian were
widely accepted within the society97.
Discrimination of the minority has
always carried within itself numerous
consequences that impact governmental
decisions. In the United States, for example,
based on a 1986 CBS/New York Times
Immigration Poll, persecuted and historically
oppressed religious denominations have a higher
tendency to support mass immigration, also a
disadvantaged minority, with Jews being the
strongest supporters 98 . Non-religious
communities were also involved in the poll, with
atheists and agnostics holding pro-immigrant
stances. A similar poll was conducted in 1988 in
France and Germany, called Euro-Barometer 30,
using random sampling. The results were no
different from the results of the 1986 poll, with
non-Catholics more likely to accept immigrants.
On a 4-point scale, not belonging to the Catholic
denomination increases the tolerance to migrants
by .610 points 99 . That is, governments and
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Identity, Fear and Governance in the 21st Century 2012,
eds. Juliet Pietsch and Haydn Aarons (Canberra: ANU
Press, 2012), 52.
97
Ibid., 53
98
Joel Fetzer, “Religious Minorities and Support for
Immigrant Rights in the United States, France, and
Germany,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37,
no. 4 (1998): 44.
99
Ibid., 46

Patrick West, “The Poverty of
Multiculturalism,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 94
no. 374 (2005): 151
93
Kaya, “Multiculturalism and Minorities in Turkey,”
309.
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West, “The Poverty of Multiculturalism,” 152.
95
Paul Marshall, “Patterns of Contexts of religious
Freedom and Persecution,” The Brandywine Review of
Faith and International Affairs 2 no.3 (2004).
96
Gary Bouma, “Minority Religious Identity and
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citizens shape their countries, and all of the
examples above explicitly demonstrate that.
Lester and Roberts consider that
“religious tolerance requires the establishment of
an environment where believers are able to feel
comfortable
expressing
their
religious
identity.”100 However, in the modern world, it is
not so difficult to come across nations that show
intolerant and disrespectful attitude toward the
religious minorities since, typically, people in
such communities consider their beliefs as a
correct religious approach and force members of
religious minorities to accept their “true”
religion. 101 As an illustration, in one of the
biggest Eastern countries India, the members of
Hindu right-wing parties in their speeches
constantly emphasized that all minorities,
including religious minorities, must become a
part of Hindu culture.102 Therefore, they coerced
people to accept their ideology. Even, in 2002,
hundreds of Muslims who were considered as a
religious minority, were killed by Hindus in
Gujarat state with the help of the police and some
public officials.103 This case is the most extreme
form of religious intolerance that, unfortunately,
resulted in the brutal murder of innocent people
whose fault was merely their religious affiliation.
Indonesia’s transition to democracy has been
accompanied by religious violence where
Catholic refugees from non-independent East
Timor still languish in the western half of the
island. 104 Another example is Laos which
follows the patterns of Vietnam where the
government has sought to control the major
Buddhist group, and has also been violently
repressive of the rapidly growing churches
among the tribal people. 105 Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan make it almost impossible for nonapproved Muslim and Christian groups to have
legal status, and then persecutes them as legal.

The list can be continued with numerous cases of
religious oppression. Besides, statistics and
records indicate that religious intolerance exists
not only in the Eastern countries but also in many
developed countries. In fact, it is terribly
disappointing that religious intolerance of local
people, which is a flagrant violation of human
rights, is frequently encountered in the freedom
of choice defender and supporter countries. As a
result, all of these cases serve as proof of the
degree of religious intolerance demonstrated by
governments and people even in the biggest and
the most powerful countries around the world.
2.2. The attitude of Azerbaijan toward
Religious Minorities
At some historical point, Azerbaijan has
also witnessed religious oppression. In 1920th
when the Soviet regime was established in
Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Education and
Confession of the ADR (Azerbaijan Democratic
Republic) was abolished. Moreover, all religious
teachings both in private and public schools were
prohibited. One of the most significant days in
Islamic religion – Ashura underwent criticism
during the imperial time at the end of the
nineteenth beginning of the twentieth century.
And only with the acceptance of independence in
1991 and the advent of a new government, all
these bans were lifted.
One aspect that makes a country
multicultural is its geographical location;
Azerbaijan, which is located in intersection of
various cultures and civilizations, is one of these
countries with multicultural population including
such ethnic diversities as Udins, Ingiloys, Krizes,
Hilalugs, Budugs, Tats, Talishs, Lezghins;
immigrant diversities, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians,
Belarusians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks, Assyrians,
Germans, Tatars; and finally, religious
diversities, i.e. Muslims (≈94.2%), with Sunnis

Emile Lester and Patrick Roberts, “The Distinctive
Paradox of Religious Tolerance: Active Tolerance as a
Mean between Passive Tolerance and Recognition,” Public
Affairs Quarterly 20 no. 4 (2006): 334.
101
Martha Nussbaum, “Religious Intolerance,” Foreign
Policy 144 (2004): 44.
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(≈15%) and Shias (≈85%), also, Christians
(≈4.6%), and Jews (≈1.2%), living together and
enjoying their rights and traditions. Fortunately,
the concept of multiculturalism as well as
religious tolerance and respect are strongly
supported by the current government, which has
been selected by the local people. Today,
government’s proper interferences including
annual allocation of the state budget on religious
needs, financial and moral support for languageminority schools, and organization of religious
and national celebrations, have more important
impact on the integration of ethnic, religious, and
cultural minorities within the country.106 While
many governments do not allocate funds for
religion, Azerbaijani government policy has
always satisfied the cultural and religious needs
of its citizens without any distinctions. 107
Moreover, according to national policy, the
Constitution of Azerbaijan ensures equal rights
and opportunities to representatives of different
nations in various work spheres. According to
Kunina, Milli Majlis, a national assembly of
Azerbaijan, consists of representatives of
different ethnic diversities such as Russians,
Lezghins, Kurds, Tats, Talishs and others. 108
Consequently, delegates of the minority groups
noticeably contribute to the development of the
country. In his speech, the President Ilham
Aliyev always points out that the “traditions of
multiculturalism have always existed in
Azerbaijan for centuries indeed, merely, it has
been differently called, but the essence hasn’t
changed”.109 The idea of multiculturalism in this
country is strongly supported by the population.

It is not random that decisions of a government
about such crucial issues are successfully
implemented; normally, they are implemented
only when they get approval from the locals.110
The decree of the President of Azerbaijan “On
the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on
the State Support for the Promotion of the
Languages and Cultures of National Minorities,
Smaller Peoples and Ethnic Groups Living in the
Republic of Azerbaijan” was ratified by the
government of the Republic of Azerbaijan; the
President’s Office established a special
department for national minorities’ support. 111
Additionally, Youth for Alliance of Civilization
(YAOC), an organization of the United Nation’s
Alliance of Civilization (UN AOC), was initiated
in 2007.112 The main goal of this project was to
gather 45 young leaders who represent various
cultures and religions to participate in the process
of solving conflicts created by religious and
cultural phobias. According to Ahmadov, this
movement was established with the purpose to
raise awareness in young people about the
cooperation
against
misunderstanding,
misconception and extremism due to the fact that
they are considered to be more vulnerable to
negative ideological trends.113 Moreover, Global
Youth Movement for AOC (GYMAOC) was
founded to institutionalize this movement in
April 2011 in Baku. 114 According to President
Ilham Aliyev, one of main goals of Azerbaijan is
to enable everyone to benefit from financial
development, growth of the oil industry, equal
rights and choice of any belief. 115

Ramiz Mehdiyev et al., The President of the Republic of
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of
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107
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108
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International
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In line with the above-mentioned,
national and religious minorities in Azerbaijan
can benefit from social, cultural and educational
aspects of life. For instance, the existence of a
Russian community within Azerbaijan gives
opportunity for the Russians to read newspaper,
to watch TV channels, and to receive education
in their native language. People can get
education in the Russian language not only at
schools, but also at higher educational
institutions, colleges and universities operating
in the country.116 Ukrainian language is likewise
respected and used by the Ukrainian faculty that
operates at Baku Slavic University.117
As previously mentioned, people can
choose their beliefs without any restrictions by
the Azerbaijani government; consequently,
many places of worship such as Orthodox and
Catholic Churches and Jewish Synagogues are
as equally valued as Mosques in the country.
For example, Holy Myrrhbearers Cathedral,
built in Baku in the 20 century by
philanthropist Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, was
reconstructed in the 21 century by another
Azerbaijani benefactor. Moreover, the
government did not confine itself to just giving
oral support to religious minorities but realized
it with its actions. For instance, one of the oldest
churches in the Caucasian region – the Church
of Caucasian Albania – has been restored and
provided its use for Christians with the
command of the President.118 The church,
blessed by pontiff Iohanne Pavel, was rebuilt by
preserving traditions of the previous one.119 One
of the ethnic and religious minorities living in
Azerbaijan throughout its history have been
followers of Judaism. During recent years,
Azerbaijani government together with the
Muslim community reconstructed an extant
Jewish Synagogue. Another peculiarity that

makes Azerbaijan different from other countries
is its preservation of a place called the “Red
Village” where Jews have lived for the longest
period of time in one area in Azerbaijan. Neither
the government nor local people interfere in the
lives, traditions and religious practices of Jews
in the country. For instance, in the streets of
Azerbaijan, people can freely wear kippah,
which is a Jewish male head covering.
Moreover, such religious events as Shabbat and
Torah dedication ceremony (the holy book in
Judaism) are held without any prejudices by the
Azerbaijani nation. In his press conference with
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
President Aliyev underlined that there were
seven Synagogues and five Jewish schools in
Baku such as Chabad Ohr Avner inaugurated in
2010.120 Before that, Azerbaijani government
had never allowed opening educational
institutions for pious minority groups due to the
fear of radical religious ideologies. Ignoring this
risk, the former leader of Azerbaijan, Heydar
Aliyev, who always placed a great emphasis on
education and minority groups of the country,
initiated establishment of the Jewish school in
2003. His move is respected and blessed by
many Jewish people and leaders. Moreover,
according to Jewish Telegraphic Agency,
Executive Director of the Federation of Jewish
Communities Avraham Berkowitz commented
on Aliyev’s humanitarian action toward Jews in
the following way: “It is important that in the
current international situation, the leader of a
Muslim country can stand up to protect the
rights of its minority.”121
A strong support for religious
institutions by Azerbaijanis exists not only
inside the country but also outside it. According
to Georgian Today newspaper, a memorandum
was signed in 2014 between Azerbaijan and
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Georgia so that the State Oil Company of
Azerbaijan Republic would provide free gas for
churches, mosques, synagogues and monasteries
in Georgia.122
Today we can observe a certain number
of schools and other educational institutions
open for religious minorities where people do
not only get education in their mother tongue
but are allowed to celebrate and commemorate
all important dates and days according to their
nationalities and confessions. For instance, at
the end of June - beginning of July Bashkir,
Idel-Uralian, and Tatar nations of the country
can celebrate a Sabantuy - a very old tradition
among farming communities going back to the
times when Bashkir and Tatar nations were
roaming tribes. Yet, this all does not detach
religious minorities from the mainstream
country events and holidays.
One of the controversial issues regarding
the religious majority is a division of Islam into
Shia and Sunni branches. The majority of
people living in Azerbaijan are followers of
Islam, which was divided into two groups such
as Shia and Sunni. The division arose when the
community was deciding who would replace the
Prophet Mohammad when he died in 632 AD.
Various features of these two groups triggered
development of different systems of law and
theology. Sixty-three percent of 43 countries
have an official state religion named Sunni
Islam, Shia Islam or just Islam.123 According to
Abdo et al. the majority of Shias are rooted in
Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, with its
plurality in Lebanon, whereas Sunnis compose
majority in more than forty countries from
Morocco to Indonesia.124 Today, ancient

religious split has caused increased conflicts in
the Middle East and Muslim countries.125
Nevertheless, Muslims from these two groups
have lived in Azerbaijan side by side without
any struggle and problems for hundreds of
years. Also, Sunnis and Shias can marry each
other and pray at the same mosques. As Abdo et
al. say, “They share faith in the Quran and the
Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform
similar prayers, although they differ in rituals
and interpretation of Islamic law.”126 One of the
reasons for people’s positive attitude toward
religious freedom is that only 21% of
Azerbaijanis believe that religion plays an
essential role in their lives. Due to this low
percentage of pious people, Azerbaijan is
considered as one of the least religious (secular)
countries in the world.127 As earlier indicated,
those members of Sunnis and Shias have
peacefully lived in several countries throughout
the centuries, and it can be implied that
Azerbaijan is on par with these countries.128
Thus, all these mentioned examples once again
prove that Azerbaijan is a multicultural country
and is capable of sharing its experience with
other countries to fight persecutions and
discrimination in the world.
Conclusion
Absolute tolerance to every single
individual, regardless of his/her ethnicity and
obtained identity, is a utopian fantasy that can
never be achieved due to human nature at its
core, but achieving the best possible level of
tolerance is a manageable task. Azerbaijan, with
its rich and colorful history and experience of
true discrimination at a time, has committed
itself to reach that kind of level, and is on the
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right route. Mutual respect, tolerance and
understanding continually reign in the country.
The practice demonstrates that in contrast to
those countries where the governments and
people give way to hate, aggression, oppression,
disrespect and intolerance toward religious
minorities, countries with religious tolerance
and a multicultural approach are capable of
rapid development in many fields. Usually,
countries and their representatives claim to
stand for tolerance and open-mindedness, but it
is rare when a country delivers on that promise.
If Azerbaijan and other countries guided by
multiculturalism continue setting an example
and become the frontrunners for religious
tolerance, that trend of false promises will
eventually decline. Many developed countries
claim to be the bedrock of democracy and
tolerance to people of all identities, but without
basic equal treatment to all religious
denominations, that original claim is worth the
fraction of its actual meaning. Countries
worldwide should dedicate their time to
thoroughly analyze and come up with adequate
solutions to religious intolerance issues.
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